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12 The Sociology of Labor Markets 
and Trade Unions
Wolfytm0  Streeck
T h is  c h a p t e r  deals with the relationship between 
trade unions and labor markets. It cannot even at­
tempt to offer a comprehensive treatment o f either 
o f  the two. The first section, “Labor Markets and 
Trade Unions in Sociological Research and Theo­
ry,” takes stock o f core concepts and research 
traditions informing, or potentially informing, an 
economic sociology perspective on the subject. It 
is followed by a systematic discussion linking trade 
unionism to the interaction of supply and demand 
in different types o f labor market, leading to a his­
torically grounded typology o f labor markets and 
trade unions and to an exploration o f the relation­
ship between trade unions and politics on the one 
hand and the economy on the other (“Labor Mar­
kets and Trade Unions: Between Economy and 
Society”). Next comes a stylized historical account 
o f  the coevolution of modern trade unions, labor 
markets, and the welfare state in different ad­
vanced industrial countries. The chapter concludes 
with informed speculation on the future o f labor 
markets and trade unions in the postindustrial era 
(“The Rise and Decline o f Trade Unions”).
Inevitably the chapter trespasses on the territo­
ries o f a variety o f disciplines. Economic sociolo­
gy has pointed out the significance for the op­
eration of labor markets o f  functionally diffuse, 
noncontractual relations between individuals that 
form extended networks o f communication and 
mutual obligation. It has also emphasized the 
embeddedness in such networks o f the function­
ally specific, contractual employment relations 
created in labor markets. But it has conceded the 
formal institutions that regulate labor markets 
largely to economic efficiency theories (table 1). 
Unions as collective actors do not appear much in 
economic sociology either.1 Although rooted in 
the same informal social structures that also un­
derlie labor markets, they were left to political so­
ciology and political science on the one hand and 
to industrial relations on the other, depending on 
whether they are considered in functionally dif­
fuse political or functionally specific economic 
contexts.
L a b o r  M a r k e t s  a n d  T r a d e  U n io n s  in  
S o c io l o g ic a l  R e s e a r c h  a n d  T h e o r y
The Sociology of Labor Markets
While historical sociology has explored the rise 
o f free labor markets in the early modern period 
(for a summary account see Tilly and Tilly 1994, 
2 8 6 -9 1 ), the mainstream o f recent sociological re­
search has focused on the structured allocation of 
individuals to jobs o f differential desirability (Berg 
1981; Coleman 1991; Granovetter and Tilly 1988; 
Tilly and Tilly 1994). In part this seems to have 
been driven by political and civic concerns about 
equality and equal opportunity, particularly in con­
nection with the feminization o f employment and 
the rise o f feminism and with, especially American, 
controversies on social and economic discrimina­
tion by race or ethnicity. Much o f the current soci­
ological literature on labor markets overlaps with 
the literature on social stratification and uses simi­
lar empirical techniques (Kalleberg and Sorensen 
1979; Sorensen 1977). It also borders with socio­
logical research on status assignment in large hier­
archical organizations (Clegg and Dunkerley 1980; 
Baron and Bielby 1980).
Generally, sociological research and theory 
maintain that the labor market is not really a mar­
ket, in the sense o f a universalistic, impersonal, 
color- and gender-blind mechanism matching sup­
ply of, and demand for, labor.2 Economic theory is 
assumed to maintain just this. It is also assumed to 
claim that unless price formation is interfered with, 
labor markets will not only clear— in the sense that 
they establish an equilibrium price for labor at 
which all who want to work are employed, and all 
who want to employ someone find someone will­
ing to work for them— but that wages and access
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T a b l e  1. Disciplines Studying Labor Markets and 
Trade Unions, by Levels of Action and Types of 
Social Relations
Type o f Social Relation
Level o f Action
Functionally
Diffuse
Noncontractual
Functionally
Specific
Contractual
Individual Economic (Labor)
action sociology Economics
Collective Political Industrial
action sociology,
political
science
relations
to employment are, or could and indeed should be, 
determined only by workers’ marginal productivity 
and employers’ marginal costs. Sociologists gener­
ally endeavor to show that free labor markets are 
impossible, and unregulated labor markets neither 
free nor fair. Absent corrective intervention, the so­
cial stratification generated by labor markets, or by 
hierarchical work organizations, is likely to be at 
odds with elementary requirements o f social inte­
gration and political stability, if not social justice.
A central difference, then, between economists 
and sociologists looking at labor markets is that 
the former are principally concerned with efficien­
cy— the optimal allocation o f workers to jobs— 
whereas the latter worry, if at all, more about fair­
ness. For economists, the condition of efficiency is 
satisfied if employment is affected only by those 
characteristics o f workers that are relevant to the 
performance o f the job in question. The result 
may, however, not be considered fair by sociolo­
gists if the distribution of relevant worker charac­
teristics can be shown to be determined by factors 
like power, family and class, ethnic origin, and the 
like. On the other hand, even if sociological re­
search can establish that employment opportuni­
ties are affected by entirely irrelevant individual 
properties, such as skin color for miners or bus 
drivers, economists can still save their concept of 
an efficient free market by including discrimination 
among the preferences ascribed to employers 
(Becker 1957).
More generally still, economic sociologists have 
argued that not only are labor markets not the sort 
o f  markets that economists believe they are, but 
they would not function if they were. Leading so­
ciological work on labor markets emphasizes the 
essential significance for their operation o f large 
chains, or “networks,” o f particularistic and per­
sonal social relations, or “weak ties” (Granovettcr 
1973), that lie at the bottom of labor market trans­
actions and precede, frame, constrain, and facilitate 
the rational strategic behavior o f market partici­
pants. In other words, while recognizing that indi­
viduals seeking employment or seeking to employ 
others strive to maximize their utility, however 
widely defined, sociologists insist that they can do 
so only in the context of, and mediated by, social 
relations that require them to behave in line with 
rules that are social rather than economic. This is 
because it is only through social relations that po­
tential employers and employees can acquire and 
assess information on each other and on the jobs at 
stake. The same applies to the indispensable estab­
lishment o f trust, where transactions extend into a 
future that is beyond the parties’ prediction or 
where contracts must be premised on the continu­
ing good faith o f the other party.3
Even though networks o f social relations under­
lie all labor market: transactions, they are not and 
cannot be set up for the purpose o f making mar­
kets function. Rather, they are governed by a logic 
o f  interaction and social integration that presup­
poses a set o f shared normative understandings, 
including at least residual acceptance o f what 
Gouldner (1961) called a “norm of reciprocity.” 
Self-seeking rational individualism is respected to 
the extent that it is normatively approved, and it is 
likely to be strongly normatively approved in capi­
talist societies where it is socially legitimate for 
market participants to look above all after them­
selves. At the same time, continuing informal rela­
tions among network participants, which are es­
sential for the market to work, require that rational 
individualism not be driven beyond a point where 
all that an individual can reasonably assume of the 
other is “opportunism with guile” (Williamson
1979, 1994). In fact, actors who acquire the repu­
tation of being nothing but opportunistic are like­
ly to be eventually excluded from the community 
o f those acting, and trading, in good faith. Agents 
that others cannot trust are not asked for informa­
tion, which means that they cannot get informa­
tion from others in exchange (Blau 1964), and 
they are unlikely to be hired if their reputation 
predicts constant haggling over the terms of their 
contract.
In sociological work on labor markets, social 
networks have been drawn upon to explain, not 
just how individuals get a job, but also why certain 
jobs are regarded as “appropriate” for certain 
groups and why some groups are over- or, for that 
matter, underrepresented in certain occupations.4
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Here the logic o f explanation usually involves a 
historical starting point, for example, a more or 
less accidental overrepresentation of a certain group 
of immigrants in the workforce o f a particular in­
dustry. Over time this crystallizes in a social pat­
tern, as workers prefer to work with their relatives 
and friends, personnel managers want to limit 
search costs and to put informal social controls 
among workers at the service o f economic perfor­
mance, and supervisors prefer workgroups to be 
socially homogenous to simplify communication 
and avoid ethnic conflict at the workplace. Once a 
pattern o f this sort has become established, it as­
sumes the character o f an informal institution from 
which actors can deviate only with an effort and at 
a cost. Such embedding of economic behavior and 
“rational” economic decisions in ongoing social 
relationships, with their specific dynamics o f suspi­
cion and trust, uncertainty, lack o f formal enforce­
ability, informal mutual reassurance, and the like, is 
used to explain a wide range o f phenomena, from 
the fact that dentists are primarily women in Rus­
sia while they are primarily men in Germany, to 
racial discrimination in multiethnic societies like 
the United States.
Access to social networks is, almost by defini­
tion, far from egalitarian. Indeed the concept of 
“social capital” (Bourdieu 2000) has been devised 
to emphasize both the high market value and the 
unequal distribution o f informal social relations. 
Sociological observations on the contribution of 
social capital to labor market success and occupa­
tional attainment may issue in calls for political in­
tervention, either to redistribute social capital or to 
neutralize its impact. Examples o f such interven­
tion are affirmative action programs or education­
al policies designed to disrupt existing patterns of 
social relations and replace them with others that 
are less exclusive and more universalistic. Sociolo­
gists do, o f course, disagree not just about the 
prospects o f success o f social engineering of this 
sort, but also about its desirability.
Remarkably, although economic sociologists 
have insisted on the essential significance o f social 
relations for the operation o f labor markets, formal 
rules and institutions regulating such relations 
have not been at the center o f sociological inquiry. 
Nor have corporate actors engaging in such regu­
lation, such as trade unions. This must appear sur­
prising, as labor law and collective bargaining ob­
viously play a major role in the functioning o f most 
modern labor markets. While it is true that indi­
viduals rely on informal social ties to gather infor­
mation on job opportunities or on the reputation
o f others as employers and employees, the rights 
and obligations involved in employment relation­
ships are to a very large extent formally standard­
ized and sanctioned by third parties, although in 
some countries more than in others.
Standardization of expectations and transactions 
through legitimate institutions cuts the informa­
tion requirements o f market participants and re­
lieves them o f the necessity to reinvent the wheel 
every time they conclude a contract. Institutional 
economists since John R. Commons have appreci­
ated the importance o f labor market institutions 
for the lowering o f what are now called “transac­
tion costs” (Williamson 1979, 1994), as well as for 
the flexible adjustment over time o f the terms of 
employment contracts to changing contingencies. 
Mostly, however, they have explained labor market 
institutions and arrangements for the governance 
o f ongoing employment relationships in efficiency- 
theoretical terms, that is, in terms o f the interests 
o f market participants in minimizing the costs of 
their transactions.5 The sociological tradition sug­
gests a different and, presumably, more realistic ap­
proach to institutions, one that emphasizes their 
normative foundation and obligatory character, as 
well as the fact that their evolution is governed by 
a variety o f social forces in addition to efficiency 
considerations, such as the distribution of power in 
society or, importantly, their own past.
To develop a more historically grounded, non- 
functionalist and noneconomistic theory o f labor 
market institutions, sociologists do well to start 
from the same informal networks o f weak ties that 
they have identified as the social fabric supporting 
transactions between individual labor market par­
ticipants (Granovetter 1974). Not just markets 
spring from networks (White 2002a) but also insti­
tutions and the corporate actors that enforce them 
(what Weber calls Herrschaftsverbande).6 Institu­
tion building requires social networks supporting 
the mobilization o f resources for the enforcement 
o f specific patterns o f action. Norm-enforcing or­
ganizations become legitimate institutions to the 
extent that they can call upon the assistance o f third 
parties if necessary (Stinchcombe 1968). For what­
ever reason, the economic sociology o f labor mar­
kets has been reluctant to move on to an analysis o f 
the dynamics o f institution building and institu­
tional change inside markets.7
The Sociology of Trade Unions
While there is an extensive sociological literature 
on trade unions, it is not primarily in the context
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of a sociology o f the economy that trade unionism 
became an object o f sociological inquiry. Trade 
unions as corporate economic actors in the labor 
market were studied, if at all, first by economists 
and later by the hybrid discipline o f industrial rela­
tions that was in the 1960s gradually spun off by 
economics when it turned increasingly formalistic. 
Economic debates centered on the question of 
whether unions were able to raise the price o f labor 
above its equilibrium market price and, if  so, what 
the likely consequences were for monetary stabili­
ty, growth, employment, the distribution of in­
come, and so forth. Early on the Austrian econo­
mist von Böhm-Bawerk in Macht oder ökonomisches 
Gesetz ([1914] 1968) had argued that it was im­
possible for unions to beat the laws o f the market. 
Later, with the firm establishment o f collective bar­
gaining in the 1950s, economists looked at unions 
as would-be monopolists in the labor market and 
tried to account for the outcomes of their activities 
by developing theories o f monopolistic competi­
tion (Chamberlin 1950). For Keynes and his school, 
unions contributed to making wages downwardly 
rigid, which was basically welcome as it helped sta­
bilize demand in periods o f recession. However, 
unions were also capable o f obstructing govern­
ment efforts to increase employment, deploying 
their organized bargaining power to absorb addi­
tional aggregate demand by raising wages for em­
ployed workers, leading to higher prices instead of 
expanding employment.
Largely disregarding unions as economic actors 
in a strict sense, sociologists considered them pri­
marily in the context o f work on social mobiliza­
tion and political organization, or collective action 
in general, as well as on modernization, nation 
building, the political-institutional representation 
o f societal cleavage structures in twentieth-century 
democracies, and the institutionalization and paci­
fication o f the class conflict in industrial societies. 
Unlike the economic sociology o f labor markets, 
the— mostly— political sociology of trade unions 
was macrosociological in outlook, although in its 
best manifestations it combined micro- and mac­
rosociological perspectives. Emblematic in this re­
spect is the work o f Seymour Martin Lipset, in 
which unions are treated as political organizations 
o f social groups in the modern nation-state, and in 
particular as contributors to its democratization 
and transformation into the democratic welfare 
state o f the post-World War II period.
Lipset’s work on trade unions explored the roots 
o f different forms of trade unionism, like craft and 
industrial unions, in the social structures o f com­
munities o f workers, such as the occupational com­
munities o f  skilled craftsmen or the socially seclud­
ed territorial communities o f mining villages and 
company towns (Lipset 1960, 1983; Lipset and 
Marks 2000). Lipset explained how different com­
munity structures gave rise to different organiza­
tional structures o f trade unions as union organiz­
ers depended, at least initially, on the networks o f 
primary relations that organized the social lives o f 
their constituents. But unionism was also and 
equally affected by the political and economic op­
portunity structures for trade unions, especially at 
the time o f their first appearance. O f crucial im­
portance in this respect were the timing o f indus­
trialization and democratization, and especially o f 
the introduction o f the general franchise; the re­
sponse of state and economic elites to unioniza­
tion; and the presence o f religious and ethnic di­
vides in a country’s political community. Informal 
group structures and institutional opportunity 
structures, Lipset showed, interacted to account 
for whether unions would become radical or mod­
erate; the extent to which they would rely on col­
lective bargaining or on political action; what sort 
o f welfare state they would favor; and whether 
their behavior in relation to employers and the 
state would be governed mainly by economic or by 
political considerations.
Central to Lipset’s political sociology o f trade 
unionism was that it analyzed the role o f organized 
collective action in mediating between the social 
structures o f communities o f workers on the one 
hand and the evolution and, ideally, democratiza­
tion o f the modern state on the other. Lipset was 
not, however, primarily interested in the impact o f 
unionization on the economy, and in fact the rela­
tionship between trade unionism and the evolu­
tion and functioning of free labor markets, unlike 
liberal democracy, largely remained outside his 
view. This was different in the work of T. H. Mar­
shall, with its core notion o f a historical sequence 
of institutional development from civil rights to 
political and social rights, the culmination o f which 
he believed to be the post-World War II welfare 
state (Marshall 1964). Like Lipset, Marshall was a 
political sociologist interested in a macrosociolog­
ical theory of die modern state, not a political 
economist or a sociologist concerned with the em­
beddedness o f economic in social transactions. 
Fundamental to his approach, however, was the as­
sumption o f an almost dialectical tension between 
the free market o f capitalism, including the free 
labor market, and the various layers o f citizenship 
rights institutionalized in the modern state, which
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led him to develop a peculiar conception of trade 
unions as collective actors crossing the boundary 
between the polity and the economy and com­
bining essential features o f political and economic 
action.
For Marshall, the recognition of trade unionism 
in the process o f democratization represented an 
intermediate step between the institutionalization 
of political and social rights. Unions organized to 
demand social rights for workers to a living wage 
and to dignity in the workplace, contributing to 
the secular progression toward effective entitle­
ment o f all members o f a political community to a 
minimum level of subsistence. But rather than re­
lying on political rights to democratic elections 
and, subsequently, on direct state intervention in 
the economy, unions, once they had won the right 
to organize, pursued their goals in the civil sphere 
of the marketplace by means o f free and voluntary, 
albeit collective, contracts. Marshall believed that 
this should be much less threatening to capitalism 
than state interventionism, as it respected the logic 
o f capitalism’s core institution, the market. Collec­
tive bargaining, therefore, although it was based 
on collective action, Marshall conceived as rooted, 
not in political citizenship, but in an economic 
equivalent that he called “industrial citizenship,” 
enabling workers to act collectively to gain social 
rights, not in the polity but in the marketplace, and 
not through state authority but through the ele­
mentary civil right to conclude contracts, trans­
ferred from individual workers to their organized 
collectivity (1964, 94).
Marshall’s concept o f collective bargaining as an 
institution inserting political action in the econo­
my and social rights in the labor market, and of 
unions as political as well as economic actors trans­
ferring public citizenship into the private sphere o f 
market and contract, contains central elements o f 
an integrated sociological perspective on labor 
markets and trade unions. The same holds true for 
the hybrid discipline o f industrial relations that 
grew out o f economics with Dunlop’s book, much 
inspired by Talcott Parsons, Industrial Relations 
Systems (Dunlop [1958] 1993). Originally indus­
trial relations was above all a praxeology o f how to 
deal with trade unions and, especially, the strike, 
propagated in the post-World War II period as a 
scientific rationale for the universal introduction of 
free collective bargaining as a means of domesti­
cating the class conflict. In its more academic man­
ifestations, industrial relations was inspired by in­
stitutional economists such as Commons (1924) 
and the Webbs (1911), who had been sympathet­
ic to unions, not just as political actors in the con­
text o f liberal democracy, but also as economic ac­
tors in the labor market. Relations o f employment, 
according to Dunlop ([1958] 1993), required for 
their smooth operation a “web of rules” laying 
down rights and obligations o f employer and em­
ployee. Its origin Dunlop located in interactions 
between employers, workers (or organized work­
ers), and the government— the “actors” o f what he 
called the “industrial relations system,” for which 
Dunlop immodestly claimed the same systemic sta­
tus as Parsons’s polity and economy. Clearly this 
did not endear industrial relations as a discipline to 
sociologists, who at the time were still fascinated 
with the symmetry o f fourfold tables and classifica­
tions, regardless o f the overriding importance for 
the functioning of a modern economy that Dunlop 
attributed to norms and institutions. Nor did it 
help that Dunlop insisted that industrial relations 
were not identical with either politics or econom­
ics, while including elements o f both, in an inter­
esting parallel to T. H. Marshall.
The function o f industrial relations, in Dunlop’s 
view, was to generate two kinds of rules in partic­
ular: substantive rules governing the relations be­
tween employer and employee, and procedural 
rules determining how substantive rules were 
made. Substantive rules in contracts o f employ­
ment laid down the terms of trade for the goods 
exchanged between their parties— “a good day’s 
work” for a “good day’s pay.” Among other things, 
they stipulated how work effort was to be mea­
sured, monitored, and motivated, and valued the 
kind of work being paid for in comparison to other 
kinds o f work. Partly such terms were fixed, not by 
the individuals immediately involved, but by the 
government or by collective agreement negotiated 
by trade unions on behalf o f workers. Procedural 
rules regulated the process o f rule making, in par­
ticular the rights and obligations o f the different 
industrial relations actors, like the right to strike or 
to lock out. The general assumption was that sub­
stantive rules regulating work and employment 
would be more efficient and legitimate if  they were 
made with the participation and, eventually, the 
agreement o f workers, rather than unilaterally by 
employers or the state. This was modeled on the 
American institution o f free collective bargaining, 
which had been a central pillar o f the New Deal 
and was widely considered at the time as a work­
able solution to problems o f class conflict ap­
parently untreatable in the ideology-ridden Old 
World— a practice that could be empirically studied 
and pragmatically improved with the help o f scien-
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tific theory, to be peddled to Europe and Japan as 
a cornerstone o f democratic capitalism. That in 
fact collective bargaining had originated in the 
United Kingdom and had first been systematically 
analyzed as a kind of private societal rule-making 
under the roof o f a facilitating state by authors like 
the Webbs and the German labor lawyer Hugo 
Sinzheimer ([1916] 1976) was only rarely men­
tioned in the predominantly American literature o f 
the time.
As collective bargaining was being propagated 
worldwide in the course o f post-World War II so­
cial reconstruction, different national conditions 
turned out to be differently receptive to its intro­
duction, and later gave rise to differences in na­
tional industrial relations that invited comparative 
analysis. Originally the comparative study o f in­
dustrial relations had been premised on strong 
assumptions on an eventual convergence o f the 
economic and political institutions o f advanced in­
dustrial countries. Most eloquently and explicitly 
these were expressed in the seminal book by Kerr 
et al., Industrialism and Industrial Man (1960)—  
a book written mostly by institutional economists 
who represented the state o f the art o f moderniza­
tion theory, at least as far as labor markets and 
trade unions were concerned. Later, by the time of 
the wave o f labor unrest in the late 1960s and early 
1970s, the accumulated research of the discipline 
o f industrial relations became relevant for a new 
generation of sociologists prompted by contempo­
rary events to take a new look at the old themes of 
class and class conflict. O f course the more or less 
“radical” sociology of the 1970s was and remained 
strongly critical o f the practical intentions behind 
industrial relations—which it understood to be to 
suspend the class conflict by embedding it in prop­
erly designed institutions. It also did not share in­
dustrial relations’ inherent belief in universal con­
vergence to a pacified, nonideological “industrial 
society” taking the place o f class-divided capital­
ism. But institutions did become central to a soci­
ology that in subsequent years rediscovered trade 
unions and labor markets, and the political econo­
my in general, from the perspective o f two central 
questions: the extent to which institutions, in in­
dustrial relations or in politics, could make more 
than a superficial difference for the functioning of 
a capitalist market economy, and whether national 
politics had a capacity to choose between different 
versions o f industrial society or had to succumb to 
constraints o f technology and market, forcing all 
countries in the end to become birds o f the same—  
American— feather.
The 1970s saw a wave o f studies on trade unions 
in a borderland between a sociology trying to re­
claim some o f the classical themes of political econ­
omy, and a changing discipline o f industrial rela­
tions, a field being trespassed upon by a growing 
number o f sociologists and political scientists.8 The 
rise in worker militancy and union membership 
after 1968 (Crouch and Pizzorno 1978), every­
where except in the United States and highly un­
expected after the literature o f the 1960s on an im­
pending “withering away of the strike” (Ross and 
Hartmann 1960), led to new research on the caus­
es o f union growth (Visser 1990). Moreover, re­
lating by cross-national comparison variables like 
union strength, in membership as well as institu­
tional position, to macroeconomic outcomes like 
growth, inflation, and employment, the new liter­
ature empirically contested the view, subscribed 
to by most economists, that strong unions neces­
sarily meant weak economic performance. Other 
studies explored, almost by necessity comparative­
ly (Dobbin, this volume), the delicate negotiations 
and “political exchanges” between governments, 
unions, and employers— a subject that especially 
interested political scientists, who began to consid­
er the degree to which unions and industrial rela­
tions were organized in a “corporatist” manner as 
an important property o f a society’s political sys­
tem (see infra). Simultaneously, Fordism and Tay­
lorism became concepts, not just for a particular 
stage in the expansion of mass markets or a specif­
ic organization of industrial work, but for the char­
acter o f the totality o f institutions governing labor 
markets and employment and organizing the capi­
talist economy in the postwar period, as especially 
in the French regulation school, which influenced 
many sociologists studying trade unions and in­
dustrial relations (Boyer 1986). Ex negativo, the 
two concepts figured prominently also in sociolog­
ical work on Japan as a new industrial nation. In 
particular the writings o f Ronald Dore (1986, 
1987) had a major impact on the new economic 
sociology, with their analyses o f the embeddedness 
o f Japanese labor markets and hierarchical work­
place relations in informal networks o f relational 
contracting (see also Macauley 1963) and in a cap­
ital market regime that corresponded to and sup­
ported the specific Japanese pattern o f industrial 
relations and employment.
Since the 1970s the sociological study of trade 
unions became more than ever linked to a historical- 
institutionalist analysis o f collective employment 
relations (for outstanding examples see Crouch 
1993 and Thelen 1991). Trade unions are today
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the subject o f a wide variety o f subdisciplines more 
or less close to a sociology o f  the economy. Sociolo­
gists, political scientists, and economists all discov­
ered the politics o f labor markets and employment 
and prominently included trade unions and in­
dustrial relations among its central actors and insti­
tutions. When class-theoretical approaches lost 
appeal and began to be contested by work on 
cross-class alliances (sec infra), different varieties 
o f trade unions, labor markets, and industrial rela­
tions systems came to be regarded as elements of 
different “models o f capitalism,” that is, different 
anti competing institutional forms o f a capitalist 
market economy with, supposedly, different com­
parative advantage and patterns o f economic per­
formance (Hall and Soskice 2001). Major themes 
o f this literature are the limits and conditions of 
change in national systems of internally comple­
mentary economic institutions, and generally the 
evolution of such systems under the impact of 
common technological and economic challenges, 
in particular those related to internationalization. 
Once again, the core issue is convergence and di­
vergence, and with it the general role o f politics in 
the organization of the economy.
L a b o r  M a r k e t s  a n d  T r a d e  U n io n s :
B e t w e e n  E c o n o m y  a n d  S o c ie t y
Labor markets pull together labor supply and 
labor demand in contractual relations o f employ­
ment (for a more extended definition see Tilly and 
Tilly 1994, 286). Trade unions act on both labor 
supply and labor demand, and they undertake to 
regulate the relations o f employment between the 
two. Union action in all three dimensions is con­
strained as well as facilitated by the social and legal 
order enforced by the state and interacts with the 
state’s own interventions in the market economy 
(Solow 1990; see fig. 1).
The supply o f  free labor in a society— the quan­
tity and quality o f labor offered to employers at
F ig u r e  1. Labor markets and trade unions in context
market price— depends on the social structure, for 
example, the relationship o f households to the pri­
mary sector, on the distribution of income, on so­
cial norms governing preferences for income over 
leisure, the role o f women in society, the educa­
tional system, provisions for social welfare, as well 
as on a wide range o f other factors. Labor demand, 
in turn, is affected, among other things, by the size 
o f product markets, available production technol­
ogy, the organization o f work— in particular pre­
vailing patterns o f horizontal division o f labor and 
vertical authority at the workplace— and govern­
ment economic and social policy.
The central institution of the labor market is the 
employment relationship, which in liberal societies 
since the end o f feudal servitude is constituted by 
contract (Spencer [1873] 1961; Maine [1861] 
1960). In a stylized account, with the progress o f 
industrial society from early industrialization to the 
decades after World War II, the employment rela­
tionship as an institution has in most countries and 
sectors become less like a contract o f  work and 
more like a contract o f  employm-ent (table 2). This 
corresponds to a shift from integration to separa­
tion o f conception and execution, from “craft ad­
ministration” (Stinchcombe 1959) o f work to 
bureaucratic-hierarchical coordination, and from 
market coordination to coordination by organiza­
tional incentives inside firms (Sorensen 1994). In a 
contract o f work, the employer pays a price for a
Ta b l e  2 . The Employment Relationship: Two Polar Types
Cxm tract o f  Work C on tract o f  Em ploym ent
Labor supply: 
structure of skills
Labor demand: 
organization of work
Labor contract
Skilled: integration of 
conception and execution
Project by project 
craft administration
Sale of labor, price for 
completed project
Deskilled: separation of 
conception and execution
Ongoing, bureaucratic 
administration
Sale of labor power, 
wage for time available
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particular piece o f work— a “jo b ”— basically upon 
its completion. How the work is executed is left to 
its supplier, who essentially remains an indepen­
dent subcontractor. After the work is done the re­
lationship between the two sides ceases to exist; 
both are free to enter into new work relations de­
pending on the requirements o f the next job. In a 
contract o f employment, by comparison, it is not a 
particular work task that is contracted for, but the 
availability o f the worker to perform, within broad 
limits, any task assigned by the employer (Simon 
1951). Wages are paid, not prices, and execution is 
separated from conception—which is in the hands 
o f the employer and his agents. Discretion over 
what is done and how is transferred from worker 
to employer. Instead o f a temporary association for 
the duration of a specific project, the employment 
relationship becomes an ongoing and, within lim­
its, functionally diffuse organizational relationship. 
The person who was originally like an independent 
small businessman is turned into a dependent 
“wage earner.” In Marx’s terms, the sale o f labor is 
succeeded by the sale o f “labor power,” placing a 
person’s general capacity to create value at the dis­
posal o f its buyer.
The openness o f the contract o f employment is 
one o f two main entry gates o f sociology into the 
analysis o f the labor market (the other being the 
structuration o f the labor supply; see below). Not 
only the employment contract itself, but also its 
performance depends on noncontractual condi­
tions (Durkheim [1893] 1964). Formal stipulations 
inevitably coexist with informal understandings, 
and instrumental action is and must be embedded 
in expressions o f goodwill. Workers may shirk and 
employers exploit, but they also may not. Inside 
the organizational relationship that governs open 
contractual performance, skills may become idio­
syncratic, making it difficult for workers to leave, 
while workers may become indispensable, making 
it difficult for employers to dismiss— both insert­
ing particularistic social into universalistic econom­
ic relations. Trade unions act both as agents o f 
explicit specification o f contractual obligations, 
protecting workers from excessive demands on 
their labor power and making contractual perfor­
mance easier to observe, and as guardians o f trust 
in implicit and informal mutual commitments.
What has driven the transition from contracts o f 
work to contracts o f employment has been and 
continues to be much debated. It is clear that the 
transition was not universal and involved both a 
continuum, or spectrum, o f intermediate forms 
and the survival o f older forms in particular labor
market segments, industrial sectors, and countries. 
Efficiency explanations emphasize the greater flex­
ibility o f contracts with unspecified, or less speci­
fied, content; their greater potential for “rationali­
zation,” that is, for reorganization o f work to 
reduce factor inputs; and generally their better fit 
with the factory system and with mass production 
aimed at exploiting economies o f scale by stan­
dardizing products and processes (Williamson, 
Wachter, and Harris 1975). Theories o f  power and 
exploitation, by comparison, regard the move from 
contracts o f work to contracts o f employment as 
the outcome of a power struggle. By “deskilling” 
manual work, and “degrading” work in general, 
employers take the management o f production 
away from the workers, and with it the value it cre­
ates. As the latter is appropriated by employers— or 
allocated in part to a factory hierarchy o f profes­
sional managers loyal to the employer— the rate o f 
exploitation increases (Braverman 1974).
With the contract o f employment superseding 
the contract o f work, a voluntary relationship be­
tween two independent parties, in line with liberal 
concepts o f freedom and self-determination, blends 
into a relationship of authority and control, albeit 
contractually based.9 For both economists (Wil­
liamson, Wachter, and Harris 1975) and sociolo­
gists (Fox 1974), this transformation has posed an 
enduring puzzle. What for radical critics, many of 
them sociologists, was a subsumption of labor 
under the double despotism of market and factory 
(Burawoy 1983) led economists to model workers 
as risk-averse, that is, preferring a steady stream of 
income from a contract o f employment to the un­
certainties associated with managerial responsibili­
ties and, in particular, with being paid out o f the 
residual. For many economists it is this stylized 
“psychological” disposition that presumably makes 
workers prefer being controlled by others over ex­
ercising control themselves.
Labor supply and demand interact in numerous 
ways. Both are shaped by and affect a society’s sta­
tus order. For example, educational systems antic­
ipate the structure of labor demand, and employ­
ers try to get educational institutions and policies 
to deliver them the labor supply they want. In ad­
dition, individuals investing in skills make bets as 
to what skills may be demanded in the future. But 
educational systems may also be expected to re­
produce an existing social order or, to the contrary, 
change it in the name of values such as equality o f 
opportunity or living conditions. To this extent 
employers must make do with the labor supply 
they get, and learn to accommodate it in their or­
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ganization o f work and the structure o f authority 
at the workplace. For the Aix school o f industrial 
sociology, educational systems, themselves prod­
ucts o f long political struggles in a society over so­
cial integration and collective identity, are a major 
source o f the “societal effect” that molds the or­
ganization o f work in nationally distinctive ways 
(Maurice, Sorge, and Warner 1980; Maurice, Sell- 
ier, and Silvestre 1986b).
Central to sociological analyses o f the labor mar­
ket is the insight— sporadically rediscovered by 
mainstream economics (Williamson, Wachter, and 
Harris 1975)— that labor is a commodity with very 
special characteristics, and perhaps not really a 
commodity at all ( Polanyi 1944 speaks of labor as 
of a “fictitious commodity”). On the surface this is 
indicated by its perverse, or backward-bending, sup­
ply function. Not only may the supply o f labor de­
cline as the price o f labor increases, due to prefer­
ences for leisure over income in economic terms 
or, in sociological terms, to worker traditionalism 
in communities where work effort is determined 
by fixed needs, rather than needs expanding with 
growing opportunities (Marx [1867] 1984; Weber 
[1904] 1987). The supply o f labor may also in­
crease as wages decline, as a result of social or phys­
ical dependence o f workers on a minimum level o f 
income: if wages fall, workers cannot opt for 
leisure and wait for an improvement in relative 
prices since in between they need to pay their bills. 
At the bottom of this is the fact that labor as a 
commodity cannot be detached from the social 
and physical life o f its seller. Another aspect o f the 
social, personal, and physical embeddedness o f labor 
is that its seller must be present in person while it 
is being used by its buyer, and indeed must active­
ly collaborate in its use. The site o f such collabora­
tion is the firm as a social organization designed to 
extract labor from employed workers—which re­
quires the workers’ goodwill and cannot normally 
be done by despotic means alone (Burawoy 1983; 
Sorensen 1994). In fact in more complex produc­
tion processes— or in Marxist language, in an ad­
vanced capitalist “labor process”— employers need 
some sort o f legitimacy as wielders o f authority 
(Bendix [1956] 1974) to mobilize normative 
commitment on the part o f workers substituting 
for impracticable direct controls.10
Moreover, labor is not a homogenous good, and 
the labor of one person cannot always and easily be 
replaced with that o f another. This gives rise to a 
subdivision o f the labor market in more or less sep­
arate segments, forcing economists reluctantly to 
give up the simplifying assumption o f one big mar-
lcet in which labor is competitively traded (Kerr 
1954). In addition, as skill formation is tanta­
mount to a process o f socialization, differences in 
skill tend to be reflected in social identities and in 
social structures, that is, in divisions and relations 
between and within social groups. Vice versa, to 
the extent that differences between groups are 
linked to different kinds o f “human capital,” 
groups may defend their identities by monopoliz­
ing access to particular labor markets, especially if 
their human capital requires costly investment. 
Moreover, skills may be specific, or idiosyncratic, 
not just to social groups, but also to particular 
work relations and workplaces, in which case they 
are built up only in ongoing employment relation­
ships. Due to their attachment to specific individ­
uals and social relations, that is to say, the forma­
tion and utilization o f skills takes place in much 
more particularistic and much less universalistic 
contexts than is captured by market models with 
their emphasis on impersonal competition.
This, in turn, is just another way o f saying that 
the special characteristics o f labor as a commodity 
give rise to inevitable imperfections o f labor mar­
kets as markets.11 Ultimately the perverse supply 
function of labor— the fact that workers cannot 
wait in times o f declining real wages for the price 
o f labor to recover— raises the possibility o f ru­
inous competition. In addition, to the extent that 
the supply o f labor is enmeshed in social structures 
and identities, and thereby difficult to convert on 
short order, workers may be stuck with their human 
capital, enabling employers to bid down their wage 
by threatening them with unemployment. Again, 
while employers can wait until workers accede to 
their terms, workers cannot, or not as long. The 
same may happen if workers have developed “idio­
syncratic” skills that they can sell only to one par­
ticular employer, or group of employers; as a result 
they may refrain from developing such skills alto­
gether (Williamson 1988). While the many oppor­
tunities for opportunism offered by pure labor 
markets to employers make such markets ineffi­
cient from an economist’s viewpoint, they make 
them unfair from the perspective o f workers, due 
to a fundamental imbalance in the power o f the 
two parties in the labor market. In the view o f clas­
sical sociology, this asymmetry makes the free 
labor contract free only in form and on paper and 
turns it into a coercive, unequal contract unless 
corrected by proper social institutions (Durkheim 
[1893] 1964).
The formation o f trade unions was a historical 
response to the perceived unfairness o f markets for
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labor or, in White’s terms, to the gap between 
economic allocation in labor markets and social 
valuation (White 2002b). Unions close this gap by 
trying to shape allocation so that it conforms to 
valuation, mobilizing collective action out o f social 
structures in which resides, not just information on 
individuals’ economic utility, but also their com­
mitment to social values. Political mobilization en­
ables the sellers o f labor to speak with one voice 
rather than with many, in the same way as the em­
ployer speaks with one voice. Collective action 
drawing on, representing, and defending the social 
identities and structures o f  the society supplying 
the labor, is to rectify the power imbalance inher­
ent in fragmented competition between workers 
vitally dependent on employment. Unlike individ­
ual workers, labor as a corporate actor has the 
means to wait as long as the employer, and perhaps 
longer, and negotiate terms of exchange compati­
ble with social life beyond the market and the so­
cial values that govern it.
Trade unions organize to make free labor mar­
kets fair through institutional safeguards that make 
them less like pure markets, especially by carteliza­
tion of the supply o f labor. By limiting the reach of 
market relations into the social life o f workers, 
unions contain the commodification o f labor and 
thereby add to the imperfections o f labor markets, 
making them less flexible by subjecting them to so­
cial regulation. At the same time, however, by sus­
pending ruinous competition and creating insti­
tutions o f contractual governance that protect 
workers’ investment in skills, unions overcome in­
herent imperfections o f labor markets and make 
them work in the first place. They can thus be seen, 
and have been so seen, as agents o f both suspen­
sion and perfection o f labor markets, o f decom­
modification as well as commodification of labor, 
o f fairness as well as o f efficiency. This is what made 
them suspicious to radical socialists like Marx, and 
acceptable to bourgeois economists like Brentano 
(1 8 7 1 -7 2 ). The double face  o f trade unions reflects 
the fact that, due to the inseparable attachment of 
labor to social actors, labor markets and work or­
ganizations can be more than minimally efficient 
only to the extent that they are governed by legit­
imate social institutions.12
In sum, far from being alien to free labor mar­
kets, unions— as agents o f social regulation of con­
tractual relations o f employment— have from the 
beginning been essential to their operation. 
Unions embed labor markets in social institutions 
and integrate them in a society’s “moral economy” 
(Scott 1976): they make the market respect the
connectedness o f labor as a commodity to the 
physical and social life o f its sellers, and ensure that 
the employment o f labor remains compatible with 
the social norms and obligations to which workers 
are also subject. Unions promulgate social regula­
tion o f contractual relations in free labor markets 
to make them sufficiently predictable for partici­
pating individuals to support stable social identities 
and relations, and for individuals with stable iden­
tities and relations to participate in them. In this 
way unions try to set limits to what Polanyi (1944) 
calls the “satanic mill” o f the market, preventing it 
from destroying the social fabric on which it de­
pends for its continuing operation.
Collective action in pursuit o f fairness and secu­
rity protects labor from complete commodification 
and society from the vagaries o f the market, mak­
ing labor markets both socially legitimate and less 
than completely flexible. To make labor markets 
compatible with the moral economy o f their mem­
bers and their societies, different trade unions cre­
ate different types o f market rigidities. How much 
flexibility these leave, and must leave, for adjust­
ment o f firms and industries in a modern economy 
is a matter o f debate— one that ultimately reflects 
the fundamental tension between the dynamism of 
a capitalist economy and the need for stability o f 
social relations. Whereas economists tend to be­
lieve the best rigidities to be no rigidities, sociolo­
gists insist that there cannot be economic flexibili­
ty without social rigidity, and distinguish if at all 
between different sorts o f more or less “flexible 
rigidities” (Dore 1986). Unions impose rigidities 
on labor markets in basically three ways: by trying 
to control the supply o f labor, by trying to match 
the demand for labor to its supply, and by enforc­
ing standardized contractual conditions on work­
ers and employers.
Labor Supply
Unions are cartels o f sellers o f labor, exempt in 
all Western societies from even the strictest anti­
trust laws, in implicit recognition of the special 
characteristics o f labor as a commodity. Enabling 
workers to speak with a collective voice, unions 
replace individual with collective contracts and 
thereby correct the imbalance o f power that dis­
torts individual bargains between workers and em­
ployers. Unions furthermore control the amount 
o f labor employers can extract from workers, by 
setting and enforcing minimum wages and maxi­
mum hours. To do so, unions must be able tem­
porarily to boycott employers by coercively cutting 
o ff their labor supply. This, too, has come to be
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widely accepted, even in the law of the United 
States, as a necessary and legitimate means to make 
labor markets less unfair.
Another dimension in which unions intervene in 
the supply of labor is skill formation. Here, diverse 
and complex bargains have emerged in different 
societies between organized labor on the one hand 
and the state and employers on the other. In some 
countries anti industries, unions control industrial 
training and command a capacity to limit access to 
it, so as to drive up the price o f skilled manual 
labor. In part this follows the model o f the liberal 
professions. Elsewhere unions have to the contrary 
urged employers and the state to promote training, 
as a precondition for them to compress wage dif­
ferentials; in such countries control over training is 
shared, with more or less union involvement. Im ­
portant cross-national differences exist with re­
spect to the role o f apprenticeship in relation to 
public secondary and tertiary education, and to 
the role o f unions, employers, and the state in the 
governance o f apprenticeship (Crouch, Finegold, 
and Sako 1995). Differences in national systems of 
human capital formation are, in turn, related to 
differences in industrial capabilities and compara­
tive advantage, in patterns o f social stratification 
and social mobility, in the life courses o f individu­
als, in political power structures, and in prevailing 
ideas about social justice, equality, freedom of 
choice, individual achievement, and so on (Mau­
rice, Sellier, and Silvestre 1986a).
Third, unions often try to institutionalize rules 
o f  access to employment, based on a variety o f cri­
teria well beyond ability to do a job. Getting em­
ployers and the state to agree to limiting the pool 
o f applicants for a particular sort o f jobs, or hiring 
applicants only in a particular order, helps to elim­
inate cutthroat competition among workers. A wide 
variety o f institutions have been invented, like hir­
ing halls— sometimes run by the unions them­
selves— or the seniority principle, to introduce into 
otherwise chaotic or exploitative labor markets a 
sort o f order that workers can accept as fair. Rules 
o f access also protect workers’ investment in skills 
where labor markets are “balkanized” (Kerr 1954) 
by barriers o f entry that allow employers to hire 
only skilled workers for skilled jobs. In the litera­
ture, occupational labor markets, where access to 
employment is limited to people who certifiably 
belong to a particular skilled occupation, are dis­
tinguished from unskilled general labor markets, 
where access is free, and from the internal labor 
markets o f large firms, where access to positions 
above entry-level is confined to those already em­
ployed, and where priority for employment is 
given to “laid-off” former employees (for various 
typologies see Doeringer and Piore 1971; Ed­
wards, Reich, and Gordon .1979; Dunlop 1994; 
Osterman 1984; Kerr 1954). Whereas occupation­
al labor markets protect transportable skills that are 
of use to more than one employer, internal labor 
markets protect workplace-specific skills that are 
built up on the job. Access rules may also be de­
signed to protect the existence o f the union as an 
organization if employment, in either occupation­
al or internal labor markets, is made conditional on 
trade union membership (pre- or postentry closed 
shop). To economists, even before the final victo­
ry o f neoclassical theory, institutionalized access 
rules in segmented labor markets represent a threat 
to both liberty and efficiency, even though it is 
sometimes grudgingly recognized that they may 
be a necessary condition for investment in skills, if 
not for a minimum of security and stability in the 
personal lives o f workers (Kerr 1954).13
Fourth, unions can regulate the supply o f labor 
by limiting working time— the locus classicus 
being Marx’s chapter in Capital on the “Working 
Day” (Marx [1867] 1984)— and indirectly through 
all sorts o f public policies, especially on taxation, 
pensions, and welfare benefits. Depending on how 
families are taxed, incentives for women to enter 
the labor market vary between countries and over 
time. By changing the mandatory age o f retire­
ment, governments may increase or reduce the 
labor supply, with unions often pressing for the 
latter especially in periods o f high unemployment 
(Ebbinghaus 2001). Welfare state intervention, in 
the form of social assistance or unemployment ben­
efits, creates a floor under labor markets that deter­
mines the minimum wage workers must be offered 
to be available for employment (the “reservation 
wage”). Unions’ involvement in social policy, in­
cluding the administration o f public unemploy­
ment insurance and labor market policies, enables 
them to lower the economic pressure on workers to 
accept offers o f employment that do not fit their 
skills or their economic needs, or that undercut 
current minimum standards of employed workers.
Labor Demand
Unions intervene also on the demand side o f the 
labor market, trying to adjust demand to supply to 
save their members from having to adjust the sup­
ply o f their labor to rapidly and erratically chang­
ing demand. Unions as political actors exert pres­
sure, electoral and other, on governments for an 
economic policy that supports a high level o f em-
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ployment. In the period after World War II, this 
was to be accomplished primarily by Keynesian 
methods o f aggregate demand management. Unions 
also sometimes support government programs to 
make employers hire workers that they would oth­
erwise not have hired, to create more equal oppor­
tunities for immigrants and groups like women, 
disabled workers, or the long-term unemployed. At 
micro level, various forms o f employment protec­
tion, based in law or collective agreement, are to 
shield workers from short-term market fluctuations 
and make their income more predictable. Again, 
due to the social closure that inevitably conies with 
collective organization, conflicts may arise between 
workers that are employed and protected, and 
workers seeking employment and willing to under­
cut existing employment conditions, even to a 
point where competition becomes ruinous.
Also to influence labor demand, unions inter­
vene in the organization o f work. In internal labor 
markets unions press for as many jobs as possible 
to be so designed that they can be filled by appli­
cants one level lower in the hierarchy and next in 
the chain o f promotion. By comparison, in occu­
pational labor markets with lateral entry points, 
unions representing workers with transportable 
skills must see to it that these are matched by job 
descriptions. This requires that the division of 
labor is and remains similar in different work­
places, based on the training workers have received 
and the sort o f labor they are therefore able to sup­
ply. In the extreme cases o f Anglo-American craft 
unionism, this resulted in collective agreements 
under which skilled jobs were to be done, not just 
by skilled workers only, but in ways that matched 
the skills they had— putting sometimes severe ob­
stacles in the way of technological and organiza­
tional progress. Conflicts over “managerial prerog­
ative” with respect to work organization and 
technology tended to be particularly acrimonious 
in countries like Britain where occupational skills 
were narrow and fragmented, and where work was 
monitored on the basis o f specific tasks and allo­
cated to distinct “job territories” defined by “tools 
of the trade” (Flanders 1970). By comparison, 
identification o f job demands on the basis o f work­
er skills seems less inflexible where monitoring is 
by broad functions or procedures rather than tasks, 
and work is allocated on the basis o f qualification 
instead o f job territory (Marsden 1999).11
The Employment Relationship
Trade unions were major contributors to the 
transformation of employment from a spot market
contract to an ongoing organizational relationship, 
or from a contract o f work to a contract of em­
ployment. This was so especially in the post-World 
War II period, notwithstanding significant rear­
guard struggles by some unions to defend craft au­
tonomy and by some employers to defend hiring 
and firing “at will.” The institutionalization o f the 
modern “wage nexus,” as it eventually came to 
pass in all industrialized countries, albeit with sig­
nificant national differences, established a sharp bi­
nary distinction between dependent employment 
and independent self-employment, taking the 
place o f what had been a broad spectrum of con­
tractual forms in between the two. It also involved 
recognition of a broad zone o f managerial discre­
tion in exchange for various forms of protection of 
workers from economic risk. This development 
was supported in most countries by the evolution 
of labor law as a subarea o f contract law, spelling 
out special rights and obligations o f the parties to 
an employment contract, and o f the welfare state 
and its rules o f eligibility to social insurance, for 
example, unemployment benefits.
Trade unions above all pressed for standardiza­
tion o f employment contracts, to protect workers 
from uncertainty, simplify collective regulation, 
decouple the economic situation of workers from 
that o f their employing organization, and suspend 
as much as possible competition between workers, 
so as to enable them to act in solidarity. Standard­
ization involved explicit and agreed definitions o f 
normal effort, normal hours, and normal pay, guar­
anteeing employers reliable performance of pre­
dictable routine tasks at an average level o f effort. 
Standardization was also associated with strict dis­
tinctions between work and nonwork, making 
work effort easy to measure for employer and em­
ployee alike, as well as for the union as the guardian 
o f the wage-effort bargain. Generally unions tried 
to make explicit and formalize as many o f the im­
plicit and informal elements o f the contract o f 
employment as possible, so as to make employer 
demands on workers predictable and worker per­
formance easier to measure, leaving as little space 
for employer judgment as possible.
All in all, unions introduced in the open em­
ployment contract elements o f  status rights for 
workers and status obligations for employers (Tan- 
nenbaum 1964). Status elements that in the name 
of “industrial justice” (Selznick 1969) entered into 
the individual employment contract, regardless o f 
whether its parties would have elected them, in­
cluded rights to employment protection, or at least 
to notice before dismissal, to unionization and
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workplace representation, and to individual and 
collective information, consultation and, in some 
countries, shared decision-making (Streeck 1992). 
To some extent, the introduction o f public duties 
in the private employment contract had an inter­
national dimension, as it was, from as early as 1918 
on, propagated worldwide by the International 
Labor Organization (ILO ), a tripartite interna­
tional organization older than the League o f Na­
tions or the United Nations.
The evolution of the open contract o f dependent 
employment was tantamount to its infusion with 
institutional mechanisms of joint regulation (Dun­
lop [1958] 1993) o f terms o f exchange that can be 
specified ex ante only at heavy losses o f efficiency. 
From the perspective o f unions, joint regulation 
represented a necessary complement to managerial 
prerogative and was a precondition for fairness in 
unspecified contracts. (Even in the United States, 
nonunion settings for a long time followed the lead 
o f the unionized sector and mimicked its regula­
tions, if not its institutions; Jacoby 1990.) Joint 
regulation gave workers “voice” where “exit” 
would be too risky or costly in terms o f other, stick­
ier social relations. It also increased predictability, 
substituting for worker control over conception, 
and made the operation of free labor markets and 
open employment contracts compatible with stan­
dards o f fairness, that is, with consideration of 
other than economic needs and values o f workers.
As the unionization of labor markets and the 
standardization of the employment relationship 
proceeded, questions were asked whether socially 
regulated labor markets were flexible enough to 
adjust in time to changes in demand and technol­
ogy. Some authors suspect that regulated employ­
ment in the “primary” labor market is possible 
only when complemented by unregulated, non­
standard, and contingent employment in a “sec­
ondary,” nonunionized labor market, with “dual­
ism” restoring the flexibility that social regulation 
had ended (Berger and Piore 1980). The implica­
tion is that in a market economy, reduction o f eco­
nomic uncertainty for some will inevitably increase 
uncertainty for others in weaker market or political 
positions, with the lines o f division differing from 
society to society. Today, those demanding liberal­
ization o f labor markets doubt that workers, espe­
cially those with advanced human capital, are nec­
essarily at a disadvantage in relation to employers 
and therefore stand to benefit from collective reg­
ulation and standardization o f employment condi­
tions. Building on theories o f  labor market dualism 
and segmentation, social protection o f the em­
ployed is blamed in European welfare states for 
long-term unemployment and the growing gap 
between the employed and the unemployed. Ad­
vocates o f liberalization support, together with de- 
standardization and customization of employment 
conditions, a reallocation of economic risk be­
tween employers and workers, with the latter as­
suming more responsibility for economic out­
comes, not least in the form o f more contingent 
pay (Weitzmann 1984). By reintroducing elements 
o f self-employment into dependent employment, 
this would blur the distinction between the two 
that was one o f the hallmarks o f the social order o f 
industrial society.
A Typology of Trade Unions and Labor Markets
The first modern trade unions were formed at a 
time when employment was still governed mainly 
by contracts o f work (von Beyme 1977; Katznel- 
son and Zolberg 1986; Kendall 1975). By the 
middle o f the nineteenth century craft unions had 
in most countries superseded the early, often anar­
chic protest movements o f the “working poor.” 
They organized skilled workers that were hard to 
distinguish from independent craftsmen, and oper­
ated much like cartcls o f small business firms. Craft 
unions often unilaterally set prices for specified 
jobs, rather than negotiating wages with employ­
ers. Like the guilds whose traditions they inherit­
ed, craft unions were socially and economically ex­
clusive in that they tried to reserve market access to 
workers they had themselves trained. Control over 
training translated into control over work organi­
zation, where craft unions often succeeded in mak­
ing employers organize production in ways that 
fitted their members’ skills (“job control” ). Chal­
lenged by liberal free trade policies, craft unions 
were eventually tolerated, especially where they re­
mained politically indifferent or turned against 
socialist radicalism. In Germany under Bismarck, 
independent craftsmen were saved from “proletar­
ianization” by protective legislation for small busi­
ness, securing the government the unwavering 
support o f a strong Mittelstand.
In early industrializing countries with liberal 
polities, such as Britain and the United States, craft 
unions managed to establish themselves in the sec­
ond half o f the nineteenth century as organizations 
o f an aristocracy o f  labor. Industrialization and the 
advance o f the factory system proceeded only 
slowly, and continuity with earlier guild traditions 
remained strong. Early extension of the franchise, 
in the United States even before the onset o f in-
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dustrialization, enabled unions to gain organizing 
rights by political pressure and through favorable 
legislation exempting them from free trade rules 
(Marks 1989). With ample opportunities to pursue 
their economic interests through collective action 
in the marketplace, and without first having to de­
feat an authoritarian state to get legal recognition, 
craft unions tended toward liberal politics and op­
posed socialist anticapitalism. Once established, 
they resisted bureaucratization o f work organiza­
tion and defended the unity o f conception and ex­
ecution against deskilling. In this way they delayed 
the advance o f the modern factory and within it 
preserved elements o f craft organization, such as 
the “gang system” under which employers con­
tracted for specific jobs with a foreman who re­
ceived a lump sum that he divided with his crew. 
As the employment relationship began to assume 
the form of a contract o f  employment, gang lead­
ers turned into shop stewards organizing worker 
resistance against management and insisting on 
strict rules o f job control to facilitate entry and exit 
o f their members in and from different places o f 
employment. Craft particularism also resulted in 
demarcation o f “job territories” and gave rise to 
“restrictive practices” that well into the period 
after World War II compelled employers to adjust 
their technology and work organization to the 
skills o f their workers, rather than vice versa (see 
Marsden 1999 on “employment systems”).
In countries with established craft unions, un­
skilled labor became organized on a large scale 
only at the turn o f the century, in a second wave of 
unionization. General unions, sometimes also called 
industrial unions, aimed at organizing all workers 
in a workplace or industry; in fact, given the already 
existing unions o f the skilled, they mostly remained 
organizations o f unskilled laborers. Since these 
could easily be exchanged for one another, they 
commanded little market power and were unable 
to exercise the same control over labor markets as 
craft unions. Typically they depended for their or­
ganization on the assistance o f progressive political 
or religious movements, and for their operation on 
mass strikes and supportive political intervention. 
Often general unions were politically radical, like 
the Industrial Workers o f the World (the “Wob- 
blies”), which in the United States came closest to 
the anarcho-syndicalist unions o f several European 
countries at the time. In a hostile political environ­
ment, general unions with their lack o f economic 
clout were easy to suppress and, like the Wobblies, 
often became targets o f violent persecution.
As the factory system spread, general unions
gained in importance even in countries where there 
already was a union movement dominated by craft 
unions. In the United States, the Congress o f In ­
dustrial Organizations (CIO ) organized factory 
workers, miners, and longshoremen, sometimes 
against craft resistance, and grew in strength during 
the New Deal. Only reluctantly it was accepted by 
the craft-based American Federation of Labor 
(AFL), with which it later formed an uneasy al­
liance. Over time general unions in craft-dominated 
environments adapted elements o f the modus 
operandi o f their predecessors, resulting in job con­
trol practices— based on seniority rather than job 
territory— and in internal labor markets and the 
layoff system. In addition they undertook to 
strengthen the political clout o f labor, to compen­
sate for their lack o f economic power. In Britain, it 
was mainly the general unions that were behind the 
foundation o f the Labour Party, while the older 
craft unions were happy supporting the Liberals.
In late industrializing countries the advance o f 
the factory system was faster and often proceeded 
under the guidance o f authoritarian political 
regimes. They refused unions a right to organize, 
in the name o f rapid modernization of their soci­
eties and anxious not to fall behind in internation­
al economic and military competition (Marks 
1989). Guilds were abolished, and craft unions 
had little time to get established. Union organiz­
ing rights had to be won politically, which presup­
posed extension o f the suffrage. Unions developed 
as part o f a labor movement with a political and an 
industrial wing, the former dominating the latter 
at least until the achievement o f democratization. 
As the beginnings of unionization coincided with 
the arrival o f large factories, unions organized on a 
class or industrial basis, encompassing workers o f 
all skills and trades and thereby redistributing and 
equalizing bargaining power between stronger and 
weaker sections o f the workforce. Industrial unions 
were also often associated with political parties, o f 
a socialist or Roman Catholic complexion. If  they 
were fragmented, they were so by political affilia­
tion rather than by occupation, reflecting the dom­
inant political and social cleavages o f their coun­
tries (Ebbinghaus 1995; Rokkan 1968).
Early alliances o f industrial unions with political 
parties prefigured the various patterns o f political 
unionism that emerged after democratization and 
laid the foundation for the evolving symbiosis o f 
modern trade unions with the modern nation-state 
(Bartolini 2000 ; Streeck and Hassel 2003 ; Taylor 
1989; Valenzuela 1992). Reflecting their origins as 
well as their heterogeneous membership that in­
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eluded mass workers with little economic power, 
industrial unions adhered to broader and more 
universalistic definitions o f worker interest that 
could not be satisfied by industrial action alone. 
Strategically combining action in the political and 
industrial arenas, industrial unions were less than 
craft unions attached to free collective bargaining 
as the only mode o f trade union activity. In addi­
tion they relied on favorable state intervention se­
cured through political allies, not just for the pro­
tection of their organizations but also for a social 
policy that generalized social progress beyond in­
dividual occupations or the membership of trade 
unions.
At the workplace, industrial unions were willing 
to compromise with a bureaucratic factory regime, 
as long as they managed to circumscribe manage­
rial prerogative by general rules in law or collective 
agreement. As in the political arena, where they fa­
vored social policies that benefited all citizens, in­
dustrial unions tried to equalize the pay and the 
employment status o f workers as much as possible. 
Organizing across trades, they had little use for job 
control; and organizing industry-wide across em­
ployers, they preferred centralized collective bar­
gaining to make the economic situation o f workers 
as independent from that o f their employer as pos­
sible. Rather than challenging the right o f employ­
ers to reorganize work and introduce new technol­
ogy, industrial unions defended the occupational 
skills o f their members through involvement in in­
dustrial training and public labor market policy, 
and their workplace-specific skills by pressing for 
legal employment protection.
Political-industrial unionism, with its prefer­
ences for the standardization o f employment con­
tracts and o f the relationship between skill, effort, 
and pay, turned out to be highly compatible with 
the bureaucratic-hierarchical management o f 
“Fordist” work organizations. At the heart o f what 
might be called the Fordist compromise between 
large mass production firms and broad-based indus­
trial trade unions was the acceptance o f negotiated 
flexibility by workers in exchange for standardiza­
tion of employment and working conditions within 
and across firms as well as over time, insulating 
workers and their families from market fluctuations 
and giving them as much economic security as a free 
labor market can sustain. Unlike craft and general 
unions, industrial unions in Continental Europe 
conceded to firms high internal flexibility in the 
deployment o f labor, as long as it was compensat­
ed by external rigidity in the form of employment 
security and by rights to information and consulta­
tion, and sometimes shared decision-making, en­
abling unions to influence employers’ manage­
ment o f labor (“industrial democracy”; Rogers and 
Streeck 1995).
In countries where political democracy arrived 
much after industrialization, as in Japan and other 
Asian countries, unions organized, if at all, as en­
terprise unions. Like industrial unions, enterprise 
unions organize all workers in a given workplace; 
unlike them, their domain is confined to one em­
ployer only. Historically, enterprise unions reflect 
an early loss o f craft independence and a capture o f 
skilled workers in internal labor markets, at a time 
when unionization was still suppressed. Japanese 
internal labor markets are based, not on the power 
o f unions, but on an agreement among large firms 
to combat the fluctuation o f skilled labor by hiring 
at entry level only. This made it de facto impossi­
ble for workers to quit, while making dismissal for 
disciplinary reasons a severe sanction in the hands 
o f employers. In the period after World War II, the 
bonding o f workers to their employer was rein­
forced by a seniority wage system that pays young 
workers below their productivity in exchange for 
payment above productivity in their older years. To 
protect workers against employer opportunism, 
enterprise unions and large Japanese companies, 
after intense conflicts, agreed on a largely informal 
system o f “lifetime employment.” This forms the 
capstone of the integration of workers in the “en­
terprise community” o f large Japanese firms, and 
its vigorous defense constitutes the main raison 
d’etre o f enterprise unions. Together enterprise 
unionism, the seniority wage system, and lifetime 
employment make for unique flexibility o f firms in 
the internal deployment o f labor, due to complete 
detachment o f the organization o f work from oc­
cupational skills and an unlimited possibility for 
managements to deploy broad general and high 
workplace-specific skills in optimal combination 
(Aoki 1988).
Enterprise unions derive their organizational secu­
rity primarily from employer recognition. In Japan in 
die 1950s and 1960s, firms that found their unions 
too radical managed to replace diem widi more 
compliant “second unions.” Reflecting the structure 
o f Japanese labor markets, enterprise unions have 
only weak links across workplace boundaries, to po­
litical parties or union confederations. Most o f die 
functions performed in Europe by public policy and 
the welfare state are in Japan internalized in the pri­
vate welfare regimes o f large firms, including large 
parts o f social security and, o f course, employment 
protection and labor market policy. Unions there­
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T a b le  3. Types of Trade Unions, Labor Markets, Employment Relations, and Political Action
Skills
Union
Structure
Work
Organization
Labor
Market Employment
Union
Security
Political
Action
Craft union Skilled,
transportable,
union-
controlled
Particularistic, 
fragmented 
by trade
Job control External,
occupational
Job by job Prcentry 
closed shop
Voluntarism, 
“free collective 
bargaining”
General
union
Unskilled Incompletely
encompassing
Bureaucracy 
job con­
trol and 
seniority
Mainly external, 
general
At will Postcntry 
closed shop
Limited, 
due to 
voluntaristic 
tradition
Industrial
union
All skills 
partly work­
place-specific, 
contested 
control
Encompass­
ing, “class- 
based”
Bureaucracy,
negotiated
flexibility
External- 
occupational 
and internal
Protected Legal and 
political 
institution­
alization
Political and 
industrial 
action in 
different com­
binations, 
tripartism
Enterprise
union
All skills 
workplace- 
specific, 
employer- 
controlled
“Enterprise
community”
Bureaucracy,
autonomous
working
groups
Internal Lifetime “Enterprise
community”
Nonpolitical
fore have little reason to get involved in the public 
sphere. There is also little connection between union 
activities at the workplace and the political activities 
o f national confederations, which have a postwar his­
tory of extreme instability. Mostly this was due to 
their radical-leftist politics and die unending faction­
al struggles to which the former gave rise, reflecting 
bodi die marginal political status o f union confeder­
ations and their lack o f rapport with affiliated enter­
prise unions.
Unions in Politics
Different types o f unions rely to different de­
grees and in different ways oil the state for their or­
ganizational survival (“union security”) and for 
political support in regulating labor supply, labor 
demand, and the employment relationship (for 
many others see Bean 1995; table 3). Craft unions 
and, forced by circumstances, general unions in 
craft-dominated environments adhere to a volun­
taristic mode o f action based on fragmented sec­
tional organization and free collective bargaining. 
Apart perhaps from political and legal guarantees 
o f the right to organize, voluntaristic unionism fa­
vors state abstention from the regulation o f labor 
markets and employment. Negotiated “fringe ben­
efits” are preferred over legislated welfare entitle­
ments, not least since the latter are available also to 
nonmembers. Lasting suspicion of a liberal state 
unlikely to offer unions more than reluctant toler­
ation makes state-free voluntary organization 
backed by sectional market power appear the most 
reliable basis for effective representation o f work­
ers. In the twentieth century, early dominance o f 
craft unionism typically issued in adversarial, frag­
mented, “pluralist” patterns o f industrial relations, 
with a tendency toward multiunionism and com ­
petitive bargaining. Adversarial industrial relations 
combined with a minimalist liberal welfare state 
(Esping-Andersen 1990) that left trade unions 
with strong bargaining power space to negotiate 
significant additional benefits for their members.
Industrial unionism, by comparison, goes to ­
gether with broad and heterogeneous organiza­
tion. Not beholden to a well-to-do labor aristocra­
cy and typically aligned with progressive political 
parties, industrial unions tended to be receptive to 
egalitarian ideologies, which made them support 
erga omnes extension o f collective agreements and 
universalistic social policies benefiting all members 
o f the working class and, indeed, the citizenry as a 
whole. At the same time, regarding themselves and 
wanting to be regarded as representatives, not just 
o f their members, but o f all workers in their indus­
try or society, political-industrial unions faced dif­
ficult free-rider problems. This forced them to base 
their organizational security in large part on legal 
rights15 and political support, such as state facilita­
tion o f collective bargaining or corporatist partici­
pation in the administration o f vocational training 
or public social security funds.
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From early on, industrial unions had to define 
and continuously redefine a delicate balance be­
tween industrial and political action, collective bar­
gaining and social policy, benefits for their mem­
bers and welfare state provisions for citizens, and 
independent organizing capacities and state sup­
port. The result differed considerably between 
countries and over time, although generally it 
involved a “sharing o f public spaces” between 
unions and the state (Crouch 1993). In Scandi­
navia politically undivided industrial unions re­
mained closely linked into an equally politically 
unified socialist labor movement that managed to 
establish lasting political hegemony over its bour­
geois opposition. This issued in a combination o f a 
social-democratic, universalistic welfare state guar­
anteeing citizens a high “social wage,” with state- 
free but highly centralized and economically re­
sponsible collective bargaining, which was in turn 
underpinned by an extensive active labor market 
policy. Lasting control o f the labor movement over 
the power resources o f the state enabled Swedish 
unions to accomplish their objectives by means of 
“democratic class struggle”— through elections and 
government policies— and without much industri­
al conflict (Korpi 1983).
On the European Continent, by comparison, 
unions were for a long time divided as the repre­
sentation o f the religious and political cleavages o f 
their time of origin in their organizational struc­
tures “froze” (Ebbinghaus and Visser 2000). In 
addition, socialist movements split during World 
War I and in the interwar period. Where political 
divisions among unions survived, as in the coun­
tries o f the Mediterranean, where late industrial­
ization limited the opportunities for independent 
collective bargaining, industrial relations tended to 
become a vehicle o f general political confrontation 
and contestation, with union activities often sub­
servient to the strategies and tactics o f the parties 
to which they were aligned. Due to conservative 
political dominance, the emerging welfare states of 
these countries also differed from the Scandinavian 
type in that they supported the traditional family 
system and were designed to preserve rather than 
eliminate traditional status differentials.
Conservative welfare states formed also in coun­
tries like Germany and the Netherlands, where 
strong Catholic influence coincided with lasting 
divisions among unions along religious and politi­
cal lines and stood in the way o f political hegemo­
ny o f social democratic parties. Still, after World 
War II, as national economies and societies were 
rebuilt and religious and political cleavages attenu­
ated, industrial relations became corporatist and co­
operative. Trade unionism, just as in Sweden and, 
with time, in Italy, became accepted as a central pil­
lar o f the emerging “coordinated market economy” 
of die postwar settlement outside the Anglo- 
American world. In Germany, the right to free col­
lective bargaining became enshrined in the constitu­
tion, assigning a major role in economic policymak­
ing to unions and employer associations in spite of 
a basically conservative political environment.
Political-industrial unionism in its various 
permutations was one o f the foundations o f the 
“democratic corporatism” o f the 1970s and 1980s 
(Wilensky 2002): a labor-inclusive political regime 
featuring parliamentary democracy, strong social 
democratic parties, centralized trade unions and 
employer associations, tripartite economic policy­
making in a negotiated economy, and an extensive 
social welfare state. From the perspective o f plural­
ist democratic theory, centralized and monopolis­
tic interest associations, including trade unions, as 
they existed in a number o f countries outside the 
Anglo-American world, appeared to be an empir­
ical anomaly in need o f explanation and justi­
fication. Gerhard Lehmbruch’s work on “liberal 
corporatism” showed that corporatist interest rep­
resentation was not only compatible with liberal 
democracy but, like other nonmajoritarian pro­
visions in democratic systems, helped societies 
live with deeply rooted social and political cleav­
ages (Lehmbruch 1974, 1977). Similarly, Phil­
ippe Schmitter’s work on “neocorporatism” em­
phasized the contribution o f a highly organized 
civil society to the governability o f modern democ­
racies (Schmitter 1974). Essentially, corporatist in­
tegration of trade unions in the political economies 
o f the time included participation in tripartite na­
tional policymaking, also referred to as “concerta­
tion” and dealing especially with incomes policies, 
as well as in subnational parastate institutions of 
functional self-government, such as labor market 
policy boards or social insurance funds (for a gen­
eral overview see Streeck and Kenworthy 2003). 
Both represented different versions o f compromise 
between government policy and collective bargain­
ing, and between political parties and trade unions. 
In retrospect, the neocorporatism o f the 1970s 
and 1980s represented the high point o f the inclu­
sion of organized labor in the political and eco­
nomic governance o f the modern nation-state 
(Goldthorpe 1984).
Finally, in Japan enterprise unions remained 
nonpolitical, the ideological battles among their 
national federations notwithstanding, and their or-
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ganizational security continued to depend on vol­
untary recognition by employers. In this they re­
sembled American unions, just as the minimalist 
welfare state o f Japan resembled the liberal welfare 
state o f the United States. Industrial relations 
were, however, cooperative rather than adversarial, 
reflecting the community of fate between workers 
and employers in strictly demarcated internal labor 
markets. In addition, unlike Anglo-American coun­
tries Japan is a coordinated market economy that, 
however, differs from Continental Europe and 
Scandinavia in that coordination takes place large­
ly through the state at the exclusion o f unions. But 
as enterprise unions are inseparably linked to life­
time employment, which remains the cornerstone 
o f social peace in Japan in the absence o f a func­
tioning external labor market and a more than 
minimal public welfare state, Japanese unions seem 
for the time being safely established in large firms 
even without party-political or legal backing.
As Ebbinghaus shows after careful examination 
o f current typologies (2002a, 89), types o f trade 
unions and industrial relations are linked to dif­
ferent types o f welfare states (“regimes of social 
protection”) and different models o f capitalism 
(“regimes of production”), but only imperfectly. 
Cooperative industrial relations are likely to occur 
only in nonliberal coordinated market economies 
(Japan, Scandinavia, Germany, and the Nether­
lands), but in some such economies, like France 
and Italy, industrial relations are politically polar­
ized and contested. Voluntaristic industrial rela­
tions emphasizing free collective bargaining and 
state abstention exist only in liberal capitalism and 
come together with liberal-residual welfare states 
(Britain, Ireland, the United States). But in one 
country, Japan, a liberal-residual welfare state coex­
ists with cooperative industrial relations and a non­
liberal production regime. Finally, cooperative in­
dustrial relations based on political-industrial trade 
unions rather than enterprise unions, while always 
combined with nonliberal production regimes, may 
exist alongside either a conservative welfare state 
where economic coordination takes place on a sec­
toral level (Germany, the Netherlands), or a univer- 
salistic welfare state where the economy is centrally 
coordinated (Sweden, Denmark).
Unions in the Economy
There is a broad literature on the economic ef­
fects o f trade unions. Generally unionization is re­
garded as ambivalent for economic performance. 
Research and theory know positive and negative
Ta b l e  4 . A Schematic Presentation of the 
Economic Effects o f Trade Unions
Negative 
Positive Effects Effects
High trust, Low trust,
productivity rigidity
Wage moderation, Distributional 
stable growth conflict,
disequilibrium
effects o f union organization and action, at both 
micro and macro level. In some accounts the pos­
itive effects cannot be had without the negative 
ones, making the true effect o f  unionism highly 
contingent on economic and social circumstances 
(table 4).
As pointed out above, at the micro level o f the 
firm, formalization of rights and obligations limits 
the flexibility o f open employment contracts. At 
the same time, it is only through some form of reg­
ulation, joint or otherwise, that open contracts o f 
employment are compatible with workers having 
trust in the employer— which in turn is a condition 
o f informal cooperation in pursuit o f higher pro­
ductivity. O f course low trust may also be a cause 
o f unionization, just as unionization may destroy 
paternalistic understandings o f mutual obligations 
o f employers and employees (Fox 1974). At macro 
level, collective bargaining, to the extent that its 
results differ from those that a free market would 
generate, may cause inefficient factor allocation, as 
evidenced in inflation, unemployment, and low 
growth. But a high price o f labor may also force 
employers to increase productivity, with collective 
bargaining as in the Swedish model o f the 1960s 
and 1970s operating as a “productivity whip” 
(Gourevitch et al. 1984). High and equal wages 
may also serve as a “benevolent constraint,” mak­
ing employers invest in skill and sophisticated qual­
ity products (Streeck 1991).
The economic literature offers two basic models 
to understand the economic effects o f trade 
unions, Olson’s theory of collective action (1971) 
and the exit-and-voice model suggested originally 
by Freeman and M edoff (1984). The former lias 
been particularly attractive to sociologists and po­
litical scientists as it seems to make, not just the 
economic effects o f  trade unions, but also the sub­
stantive interests represented by them contingent 
on unions’ organizational form. The fundamental 
distinction is between fragmented and encompass­
ing organization, and the key factor is the strategic 
capacity o f collective actors to internalize the ex­
Micro level 
Macro level
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ternal costs o f what they do. The logic is the same 
at the micro as at the macro level. At the former, 
small unions o f craft workers stand to lose more 
from technological change diminishing their status 
and diluting their skills than what would be their 
share in the common gain from restructuring and 
higher productivity. Encompassing industrial unions, 
by comparison, would internalize the losses suf­
fered by the majority as a result of “restrictive prac­
tices” benefiting a small minority. Their mem­
bership, being broadly based and heterogeneous, 
would on average benefit from higher productivity.
Basically the same holds for the national level, 
where narrow unions, or interest groups in gener­
al, have an incentive to behave like “distributional 
coalitions” at the expense o f the common good. 
Encompassing groups, by comparison, tend to 
identify with the common good out o f their own 
self-interest (Olson 1982, 1983). For this reason 
they will do what they can to promote stable 
growth by, for example, not asking for excessive 
wage increases making for inefficient allocation 
and lost growth. While for Olson encompassing 
organization is only a second-best solution com­
pared to free market allocation, his theory was 
much welcomed by proponents o f centralized 
wage bargaining in a neocorporatist framework.16 
Indeed there are, or were for some time, good rea­
sons to argue that with centralized setting o f a so- 
ciety-wide wage norm inflation is easier to contain 
than with decentralized bargaining (Calmfors 
1993; Calmfors and Driffill 1988; Flanagan, Sos- 
kice, and Ulman 1983; Kenworthy 1996; Newell 
and Symons 1987; Soskice 1990; Ulman and Flan­
agan 1971). Decentralized wage setting runs into 
the same collective action problems as interest rep­
resentation by craft unions on the supply side and 
tends to become competitive and sectional, in the 
way of a prisoner’s dilemma game. The advantages 
of centralized wage bargaining seem to prevail 
even in countries with an independent central bank 
and seemed to last well into the 1990s (Streeck 
and Hassel 2003).
Freeman and M edoff’s general model o f the 
economic effects o f trade unions focuses on the 
micro level and builds on Hirschmann’s distinction 
between “voice” and exit” as two alternative ex­
pressions o f dissatisfaction. Where there are no 
unions, the only safe way for workers to express 
discontent with management is by quitting. But 
labor turnover is expensive as workplace-specific 
human capital is lost and the costs o f searching for 
replacements are high. Freeman and M edoff show 
empirically that in the United States, turnover is
lower in unionized firms, while productivity is 
higher. To them this indicates that disgruntled work­
ers in unionized workplaces can settle their griev­
ances by speaking through their union, and that 
settling such grievances increases worker satisfac­
tion, resulting not just in lower turnover but also 
in better work. The model emphasizes the impor­
tance o f socially accepted channels o f communi­
cation for mutual trust, and thus for extended 
exchanges like the cooperation of workers to im­
proving productivity. From here it is short way to 
what one might call an economics o f cooperation 
(Kenworthy 1995; see also Leibenstein 1987). The 
drawback is that, while unionized firms in which 
workers have voice are more productive than 
nonunionized firms, they are also less profitable 
due to the redistributive activities in which unions 
also engage (Freeman and M edoff 1984). The 
macroeconomic consequences are likely to be con­
ditional on a wide variety o f factors.
A final model o f unions’ economic effects may 
be derived from John R. Commons’s insight in his 
History o f  Labor in the United States (19 1 9 -3 5 ) 
that unions can distort market allocation o f wages 
in line with collective norms o f fairness only where 
they organize all firms supplying a given product 
market. Where this is not the case, the wage bar­
gain comes under market pressure. So, one can 
add, does the union, which may be constrained to 
shift from a distributional and antagonistic to a co­
operative stance, entering in a cross-class alliance 
with the employers that it organizes against those 
employers that are outside its jurisdiction. Such 
collaboration may be either protectionist or pro- 
ductivistic. The Japanese firm, as a competitive 
community o f economic fate, is one example of 
this, and others are unions in small countries or ex­
port-dependent sectors. In sites like these, the class 
interests represented by unions become confound­
ed with producer or sectoral interests shared with 
employers, resulting in joint pursuit o f higher pro­
ductivity and competitiveness. In recent years, with 
the economy becoming more international, this 
seems to have become even more widespread than 
in the past. Industrial cross-class alliances are simi­
lar to political cross-class alliances, for example in 
the creation o f the welfare state, as they have re­
cently been discovered almost everywhere by a re­
visionist strand o f social policy research. The at­
tempt is to show that the modern welfare state is 
not so much a distributive achievement o f the 
organized working class, as a joint construction, 
mostiy inspired by employers responding to the 
natural imperfections o f labor markets, to make
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national or sectoral economies more efficient and 
competitive (for an outstanding recent example see 
Swenson 2002).
T h e  R is e  an d  D e c l in e  o f  T r a d e  U n io n s
Unions emerged in conflict with economic lib­
eralism and political authoritarianism, striving si­
multaneously for economic regulation and political 
freedom. As a result they were originally treated as 
conspiracies against free trade, the state, or both. 
But as unions established themselves as effective 
labor market cartels, they also became suppliers o f 
labor to those employers willing to deal with them, 
and in this capacity slowly turned into “managers 
o f industrial discontent” (Flanders 1970). Similar­
ly, while unions represented the interests o f a class 
often opposed to the advance o f capitalism, their 
toleration in the course o f democratization con­
tributed to transforming liberal into organized 
capitalism, and was central to the institutionaliza­
tion of compromise between capital and labor.
Early unions saw themselves as democratic orga­
nizations o f self-help and self-government of work­
ers independent from the feudal or bourgeois pre- 
democratic state. Often they belonged to broader 
social movements that included political parties, 
consumer cooperatives, mutual assistance funds, ed­
ucational associations, sports clubs, and the like 
(Ebbinghaus 1995). While unions generally resent­
ed interference o f the state and the law in their in­
ternal organization and activities, they differed 
widely in structure and ideology. Syndicalist and an­
archo-syndicalist unions, which in a number of 
countries remained significant well into the twenti­
eth century, regarded themselves as constituent 
units of a direct democracy of producers set to re­
place both capitalist employers and the bureaucratic 
apparatus o f the modern state. These traditions, 
which were equally opposed to capitalism and to 
parliamentary democracy and favored “direct ac­
tion” over collective bargaining and political-elec­
toral lobbying, culminated in the militant council 
movements of World War I and the revolutions fol­
lowing it, in the Soviet Union and elsewhere.
Integration o f unions in democratic capitalism, 
and their recognition by governments and em­
ployers, was greatly advanced by the two world 
wars. Economic mobilization and the governance 
o f the war economy required the collaboration of 
union leaders, which in many countries came to be 
co-opted into positions o f quasi-public authority. 
In addition, enlisted soldiers had to be promised a
better life in a fairer society upon their return from 
the battlefields, and in defeated countries tradi­
tional elites were replaced in the aftermath o f war 
by liberal or socialist governments. Generally the 
end o f World War I brought political democratiza­
tion and, precipitated by the threat o f socialist rev­
olution, widespread acceptance o f collective bar­
gaining. But the first postwar settlement proved 
fragile in countries like Germany, Japan, Italy, and 
Spain, where unionism was soon suppressed by au­
thoritarian regimes. Similarly, in the Soviet Union 
workers’ councils were incorporated in the ma­
chinery o f a repressive state, and unions were 
turned into “transmission belts” from the state to 
the working class. In the United States, by com­
parison, the New Deal extended union organizing 
rights, while the Swedish Social Democratic gov­
ernment o f the 1930s and the British war cabinet 
o f the 1940s began to develop the contours o f the 
labor-inclusive Keynesian welfare state o f the sec­
ond postwar settlement.
The golden age o f capitalism after 1945 saw the 
worldwide ascendance o f a “mature” type of union 
(Lester 1958), centralized at the level o f  the na­
tional state and representing the interests of union 
members simultaneously through collective bar­
gaining and political-electoral lobbying within the 
confines o f capitalism and parliamentary democra­
cy. This development was part o f  the consolidation 
o f democratic capitalism and the nation-state in 
the countries under American hegemony, where 
legal recognition o f unions and free collective bar­
gaining, extensive social welfare provision, a siz­
able public sector, and politically guaranteed full 
employment made possible the coexistence o f 
liberal democracy and a market economy. The nor­
malization o f unionism under “embedded liberal­
ism” (Ruggie 1982) coincided with national regu­
lation and standardization of the employment 
relationship and the social status o f wage earners, 
which in turn corresponded to the advance o f in­
dustrial mass-production. Legal and political regu­
lation o f labor markets, introduced to insulate em­
ployment and employment conditions as much as 
possible from economic fluctuations, reinforced 
union power. The economic and political role o f 
unions appeared clearly defined and securely estab­
lished in a Fordist economy generating continuing 
growth based on economies o f scale and on steadi­
ly expanding mass consumption fueled by yearly 
increases in real wages; organized on a sharp cate­
goric distinction between a majority o f dependent 
wage earners and a minority o f employers; and 
gradually restructuring from small companies to
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ever larger factory organizations using advanced 
mechanical technology.
The Disintegration of the Postwar Settlement
The crisis o f trade unionism began with rising 
inflation and, in many countries, increasing work­
er militancy in the late 1960s and early 1970s. It 
proceeded in the 1980s, after the corporatist inter­
lude in countries outside the United States, with a 
shift from Keynesian to monetarist: economic poli­
cies, deregulation and privatization, the opening 
up o f national markets to international competi­
tion, and generally the withdrawal o f states from 
the kind o f economic intervention that had be­
come established in most countries between 1945 
and the early 1960s. Political change was acceler­
ated by the demise o f Communism in the late 
1980s, which eliminated systemic opposition to 
capitalism, making it less necessary for govern­
ments and employers in the West to make conces­
sions to worker collectivism. National trajectories 
differ, and so do the effects o f the departure from 
the postwar political economy on the status, the 
activities, and the future o f trade unions.
Everywhere the 1960s and 1970s revealed a 
fundamental tension in the simultaneous commit­
ment o f postwar democratic capitalism to politi­
cally guaranteed full employment and an exten­
sive welfare state on the one hand and free 
collective bargaining on the other. As Keynesian 
macroeconomic management in effect insured 
unions against adverse employment consequences 
o f high wage settlements, labor market discipline 
eroded and inflationary pressures accumulated, 
giving rise to even higher wage claims especially 
in environments with historically high rates of 
economic growth. Moreover, during a wave of 
unofficial strikes in 1968 and 1969 it became ap­
parent that free collective bargaining under polit­
ically guaranteed full employment potentially un­
dermined the unions themselves, whose leaders 
were beginning to lose control over their mem­
bers. By the early 1970s at the latest, govern­
ments throughout the O ECD (Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development) world 
were looking for ways o f restoring social disci­
pline and economic stability.
The corporatist policies o f the 1970s, which 
were attempted even in the United Kingdom, were 
to shore up the Keynesian political economy through 
a renewed political compact between govern­
ments, unions, and, to some extent, employers.
After statutory wage and price controls had failed, 
governments placed their hope on voluntary 
agreements with union leaders, buying wage mod­
eration in return for expanded social policies, im­
proved organizational privileges, participation rights 
at the workplace, legislated employment protec­
tion, government: commitments to growth-pro­
moting macroeconomic or industrial policies, and 
so on. However, at the time of the second oil 
shock at the latest, it had become apparent that the 
concessions unions demanded for their coopera­
tion in efforts to contain inflation were not only 
expensive but often had— long term— inflationary 
effects as well, not to mention the fact that union 
members more often than not failed to honor the 
commitments their leaders had made on their be­
half (Streeck and Hassel 2003 ; Streeck and Ken­
worthy 2003).
The late 1970s saw a deadlock in the political 
economy of democratic capitalism, which mani­
fested itself in a coincidence o f high inflation, low 
growth, and rising unemployment. It: was resolved 
only when the electoral success o f the U.K. gov­
ernment under Margaret Thatcher disproved the 
fundamental orthodoxy of postwar liberalism: that 
unemployment above a low level o f 3 or 4 percent 
not only meant sure electoral defeat o f the govern­
ment o f the day, but was also bound to destabilize 
liberal democracy, just as it had done in the inter­
war period. Keynesianism gave way as the leading 
economic policy doctrine to a pervasive mone­
tarism modeled on the policy of the independent 
German central bank since 1974 and of the U.S. 
Federal Reserve since 1979, the last year o f the 
Carter administration. Moreover, to revitalize the 
capitalist political economy governments— at dif­
ferent paces, in different ways, and with different 
proximate causes— departed further from the post­
war bargain by accepting and promoting a deep 
liberalization o f national economies, including de­
regulation of product and factor markets, privati­
zation of public enterprises, opening of domestic 
markets for foreign competition, internationaliza­
tion of capital markets, retreat from sectoral indus­
trial policies, and consolidation of public budgets. 
By the end of the century, Western economies 
were significantly more liberal than they had been 
at the beginning of the crisis in the 1970s, in that 
far more prices were now allowed to fluctuate 
freely and economic adjustment was sought, not 
through government intervention, but through 
flexible responses o f market participants to com­
petitive pressures.
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Trade Unions in a Postindustrial Political 
Economy
Today trade unions in all industrialized coun­
tries are struggling to defend their postwar posi­
tions o f power and influence.17 Most unions are 
losing members, and organizational density is de­
clining widely (Ebbinghaus 2002b ; Ebbinghaus 
and Visser 2000; Visser 1992; Western 1995,1997). 
In countries like the United States and the United 
Kingdom, hostile governments used the opportu­
nity o f economic restructuring in the 1980s to 
withdraw institutional supports for collective bar­
gaining and union organizing. Elsewhere the po­
litical and institutional context remained friendlier 
to unions, and where this was the case, member­
ship declined more slowly. Still, the adverse effects 
o f changing labor markets and social structures 
made unions more dependent than ever for their 
organizing capacity on favorable institutional con­
ditions and politically guaranteed provisions o f or­
ganizational security.18
Patterns o f postindustrial transformation, and 
possibly decay, o f trade unions differ between 
world regions, nations, sectors, and even localities. 
Whether current differences amount to more than 
diverse paths to deunionization, leading to eventu­
al disappearance o f organized worker collectivism 
as an industrial and political force, must be consid­
ered an open question. Indications are that cross­
national differences in rates o f unionization have 
recently been rising, resulting in an increase in di­
versity that may, however, just be temporary. Gen­
erally, there seems to a tendency toward genera­
tional and sectoral encapsulation o f trade union 
membership in a shrinking segment o f the work­
force and the economy (Ebbinghaus and Visser 
2000 ; Ebbinghaus 2002b). Union members are 
growing older on average, as density among younger 
workers tends to be low and falling. With the decline 
of die two main milieus supportive o f unionization, 
Fordist industry and the Keynesian public sector, 
most workers are now employed in settings where 
diey have few contacts if any with union members. 
The structure o f union membership in most coun­
tries resembles the employment structure o f the 
1970s, confining unions in a segment o f the work­
force that is in rapid demographic, if not economic, 
decline.
Union retreat from the positions and policies of 
the postwar settlement proceeds gradually in most 
countries, with unions largely living off their post­
war institutional power resources. While trade
unions try to adjust to the constraints and oppor­
tunities o f a changing social and economic context, 
most governments refrain from direct attacks on 
their rights and organizations, as unions may still 
inflict considerable damage on hostile govern­
ments or, for that matter, employers. In fact many 
governments continue to find themselves con­
strained to seek accommodation with national 
unions, for example with respect to wage bargain­
ing, given that high unemployment still involves 
electoral liabilities. Many employers also shy away 
from direct confrontation, in consideration of their 
vulnerability on more competitive product markets. 
Some European governments in the 1990s man­
aged to secure union wage restraint in support of 
their countries’ accession to European monetary 
union and its international stabilization regime 
(Regini 2000).
Especially in the 1980s, when the transition 
from Keynesianism to monetarism was still under 
way, unions and employers in a number o f Conti­
nental European welfare states managed to get 
governments to make social insurance funds avail­
able to reduce unemployment by cutting the labor 
supply, awarding redundant workers early retire­
ment or disability pensions, or placing them in 
labor market policy programs where they no longer 
counted as unemployed (Ebbinghaus 2002a). In 
such countries, labor supply management by means 
o f social policy began to take the place o f aggre­
gate demand management through fiscal and 
monetary policy, just like the latter insuring unions 
against negative employment effects o f labor mar­
ket rigidities and overshooting wage settlements 
(Mares 2001). This was particularly likely where 
unions, usually together with employers, shared in 
the administration of social security and where 
governments had to fear electoral retaliation for 
cutbacks in welfare state spending.
Many of the social programs that later came to 
underwrite labor shedding and early exit from 
work had been introduced for different purposes 
in the Keynesian years, often as side-payments for 
union wage moderation. Over time they became 
acquired social rights. In the post-Keynesian Euro­
pean welfare state, voter dissatisfaction with cut­
backs in social spending, especially among pen­
sioners and people o f preretirement age, became 
the equivalent o f worker unrest in the Keynesian 
era, partly shifting the power base o f the unions 
from those seeking work to those seeking retire­
ment. State policies subsidizing a high-equality, 
low-activity labor market-cum-social policy regime
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(Streeck 2001) are expensive and may with time 
imbalance public budgets. Moreover, they may 
give rise to distributional conflicts with taxpayers 
and, where social policy is funded by payroll taxes, 
further reduce employment by raising the non­
wage labor costs o f those remaining in work 
(Ebbinghaus 2001).
The Postindustrial Transformation of Labor 
Markets and Employment
Both labor supply and labor demand are chang­
ing in advanced countries, on their own and in re­
action to one another. Current trends differ be­
tween countries and sectors, and exceptions from 
generalizations must always be admitted. Still, 
union control over the labor supply is weakening 
throughout the developed industrial world, and 
labor demand is more than ever in the postwar pe­
riod driven by changing markets and technologies 
rather than by union or government intervention. 
Even where governments continue to defend the 
labor market regime inherited from the industrial 
era, including the position of trade unions, they 
seem to be unable or unwilling to make labor sup­
ply and demand fit that regime. As a result the ca­
pacity of the latter to govern employment relations 
is vanishing.
Labor supply in the postindustrial age is shaped 
by the educational revolution that began in the 
1960s, which vastly increased the number o f job 
seekers with academic training. Improved access to 
education also contributed to a secular rise in labor 
market participation of women, which in addition 
reflected changing social values and, later, eco­
nomic pressure on households. Moreover, most 
countries today experience an increase in immigra­
tion, which expands their supply o f unskilled labor, 
and welfare state reforms have lowered the reser­
vation wage and increased the pressure especially 
on the low-skilled to seek employment. Overall, 
recent decades have seen a significant growth o f the 
supply of labor to labor markets, sometimes as a re­
sult o f  deliberate public policies, accompanied by 
rising polarization in the human capital endow­
ment o f labor market participants.
Trends in labor demand, in turn, include declin­
ing mass labor markets for, mostly male, manual 
workers with low or intermediate skills who were 
the main constituency of postwar trade unions. In 
part this is because labor-intensive manual produc­
tion can today be relocated to low-wage countries, 
given modern information and communication 
technology and low transportation costs. Employ­
ment growth has shifted to the private service sec­
tor, which employs both an underclass of, mostly 
immigrant, unskilled workers and an upperclass 
o f highly specialized knowledge workers with ad­
vanced education. In both categories the share o f 
women is high. At the same time there is in most: 
countries stagnation and even decline in public 
employment, due to the end o f welfare state ex­
pansion. Employment is also declining in sheltered 
sectors, as a result o f the privatization of public ser­
vices, especially but not exclusively in European 
countries. Private manufacturing and the public 
and sheltered sectors used to be union strong­
holds, whereas in the private service sector, unions 
were historically weak.
Moreover, in response to both technological 
change and a changed labor supply, demand for 
advanced workplace-unspecific formal,skills is ris­
ing. Work tends to be organized in smaller, more 
autonomous units with lower hierarchies and less 
hierarchical decision-making, like work teams and 
small independent firms. Work units are more than 
before exposed to market pressures and coordinate 
their activities both within and across enterprise 
boundaries more by contractual than by hierarchi­
cal means. There also is a tendency to organize 
work in project groups put together at the begin­
ning and disbanded upon the completion, o f a col­
lective task, with managerial responsibilities, for 
example for job assignment and cost control, 
largely integrated in direct production work (Cap- 
pelli et al. 1997).
Again with the necessary qualifications, interre­
lated changes in labor supply and demand seem to 
affect the operation and the institutions o f labor 
markets in similar ways throughout the countries 
o f the post-World War II settlement. Common 
tendencies include the following.
An increasing wage spread, with growing returns to 
higher education, and generally a polarization of 
labor markets between insiders with good market 
opportunities who also tend to be covered by col­
lective bargaining and protective social policies, 
and mostly unskilled outsiders with little access to 
formal employment and little support from unions 
and from a welfare state designed to protect em­
ployed workers and their families (Alderson and 
Nielsen 2002).
A declining willingness o f employers to offer long­
term or lifetime employment to others than a small 
elite o f core workers, accompanied by a decline in 
employment security and in prospects o f internal 
advancement and promotion, and subsequently an
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increase in the significance o f external as compared 
to internal labor markets (Abraham 1990).
More “atypical” employment, such as part-time work, 
fixed-term contracts in countries with strong em­
ployment protection, or employment with tempo­
rary work agencies, or casual employment (for the 
United States see Kalleberg, Reskin, and Hudson 
2000). In a reversal o f the historical trend, there also 
is a tendency to move from contracts o f employ­
ment to contracts o f work, often to evade social se­
curity taxes. Forms o f atypical employment differ 
between countries, but their common denominator 
seems to be a general increase in the diversity of 
contractual arrangements reflecting diversity o f jobs, 
human capital, and market conditions.
Growing informal employment due to immigration or, 
in European welfare states with compressed wage 
differentials and social security taxes that raise the 
price o f labor, high unemployment combined with 
an increase in underground employment.
Generally with respect to role expectations, work ethos 
and allocation o f economic risk, a blurring o f the 
distinction between the status o f wage earner and 
that o f self-employed entrepreneur or professional, 
or between employee and employer. This is ac­
companied by an increase in self-employment in 
many countries, a growing emphasis on entrepre- 
neurialism, even within traditional employment re­
lationships, and a shift o f the costs o f training from 
employers. It also coincides with an increase in the 
share o f an employee’s income that depends on e f­
fort or results, o f the individual or o f the organiza­
tion, or o f both. The effect is higher variation of 
income over time as well as between individuals.
While these tendencies are not equally strong 
everywhere, and some may be at odds with others, 
workforces in developed industrial countries are 
more diverse today than they were 20 years ago; 
polarization o f the labor supply between growing 
numbers o f highly skilled and unskilled job seekers 
proceeds; the value o f increasingly diversified and 
idiosyncratic human capital in a postindustrial 
“knowledge society” is still rising; labor markets 
have become more competitive; unemployment is 
high, and informal employment at the lower end 
o f the labor market is growing. Moreover, as the 
costs o f underwriting stable employment and a 
high reservation wage become excessive for cash- 
strapped welfare states exposed to international 
markets, governments are adopting policies o f labor 
market flexibility (Boyer 1988) and “activation” 
rather than “decommodification” of labor, making 
it less possible for trade unions to rely on the wel­
fare state for suspension of competition in labor 
markets, and generally for protection of workers 
from the fluctuations o f labor and product markets.
Where the old institutions still hold, with the 
support o f the state and legal order, less standard­
ized types o f employment beyond the categorical 
distinction between wage earners and self-em­
ployed employers emerge outside o f them. Within 
work arrangements one finds a partial return o f the 
spectrum of employment relations that was sup­
pressed at the height o f industrialism; external 
labor markets gain importance and become in­
creasingly flexible, while internal labor markets be­
come less institutionalized and more like external 
labor markets (Osterman 1994); and economic re­
wards are governed less by entitlement than by 
market fluctuations, less by status rights than by 
contingent economic results, and more by individ­
ual effort or luck than by collective regulation.
Diversity or Convergence?
At first glance, paradoxically but not dissimilarly 
from other spheres of social life, the present period 
o f accelerating “globalization” may be one of grow­
ing diversity o f labor markets and trade unions, 
compared to the decades after World War II. D i­
versity seems likely to increase, particularly if labor 
market institutions evolve along with national sys­
tems of capitalism in their search for comparative 
advantage resulting from specialization (Berger and 
Dore 1996; Crouch and Streeck 1997; Hall and 
Soskice 2001). There is also likely to be more in­
ternal diversity within national systems, as these will 
have to allow for more local or sectoral variation 
and flexibility (Katz and Darbishire 2000).
On the other hand, while especially in the for­
mer countries o f democratic corporatism the insti­
tutional supports that unions won in the twentieth 
century still exist, and may yet exist for some time 
if only because o f inertia, labor markets every­
where seem to have become less amenable to reg­
ulation by trade unions. In a nutshell, the numbers 
are rising of those who have enough market power 
to do without collective organization, as well as o f 
those who have too little market power to be ca­
pable o f it. This seems to be producing a growing 
gap between the position o f unions in the political 
and legal order and their position in the economy 
and the labor market, resulting in a mismatch be­
tween societal institutions and local contractual 
constructions, or between macro- and microinsti- 
tutional arrangements. While the former still em­
phasize standardization, specification, and formal­
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ization, the latter may increasingly involve cus­
tomized arrangements, diffuse understandings, 
and informal agreements. Moreover, to the extent 
that they concern easily replaceable workers with 
little human capital, they are likely to undercut the 
conditions that were customary in the more cen­
trally regulated labor markets o f the industrial era.
This is not to say that the labor markets o f the 
future will be unregulated. Labor remains an im­
perfect commodity and continues to require rules 
enabling sellers o f labor power to reconcile market 
participation and social commitments, just as open 
employment contracts will need formal and infor­
mal mechanisms o f governance that facilitate their 
flexible and legitimate adjustment to changing 
conditions. But as the division of labor becomes 
ever more complex, and differences in human cap­
ital endowment and market position become more 
difficult for institutional intervention to override, 
how much and what form of regulation a worker 
will get may increasingly be determined by his or 
her market position. Private government by collec­
tive intermediaries like trade unions may be 
squeezed out by a liberalizing state from above and 
an expanding market from below, clearing the way 
for a new wave of commodification o f labor in 
response to dynamically changing economic and 
technological conditions. To the extent that freer 
labor markets require new if not more rules,19 so­
phisticated civil law and regulatory law— for exam­
ple on equal employment opportunities— may be 
stepping in for the corporatist middlemen o f the 
industrial era. Not only would this allow for more 
customized contracts, adapting the governance of 
the employment relationship to a new economic 
environment that puts a premium on individual 
initiative and investment in human capital. It also 
would eliminate the particularism of collective in­
terest organizations that, in a more diverse and dy­
namic society, are unlikely again to be accepted as 
representing general interests in social progress, in 
favor o f what seems to be increasingly regarded as 
a universal individual right to enter the market and 
compete.20
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1. In the subject index o f the first edition of this hand­
book (Smelscr and Swedberg 1994), one finds neither 
unions nor trade unions nor labor unions.
2. The foundational statement: continues to be Granovet-
ter 1992. On labor markets in economic sociology general­
ly, see Swedberg in this volume.
3. For the treatment of markets in economic sociology— 
as real social relations of competition and cooperation— see 
Fligstein 1996; Leifer and White 1986; Swedberg 1994; and 
White 1981, 2002a.
4. For excellent overviews see Tilly and Tilly 1994; Gra- 
novetter 1995.
5. In other words, construing what in Durkheimian lan­
guage are the “noncontractual conditions of contract” as 
originating in contractual agreement.
6. So does the law that shapes and is shaped by labor mar­
kets and employment relations. See Edelman and Stryker, 
this volume.
7. But compare the economist Clark Kerr, who writes of 
“institutional markets” characterized by “the substitution 
of institutional rules for frictions as the principal delineator of 
job market limits; of institutional and leadership comparisons 
for physical movement as the main basis for the interrelated­
ness of wage markets; and of policies of unions, employers, 
and government for the traditional action of market forces as 
the more significant source of wage movements. . . . Formal 
rules, consciously selected, supplant informal practices deter­
mined by market conditions. Nor are policies solely devel­
oped by the private governments of industry and organized 
labor, but also by public government,” etc. (1977, 42).
8. For an entirely arbitrary sample see the contributions 
to Regini 1992.
9. Making the contract of employment a highly formal­
ized case of a “relational contract” (on the concept see Mac- 
neil 1980).
10. In the language of institutional economics, this turns 
the labor contract into a “partial gift exchange” (Akerlof 
1986), to the extent that workers contribute their labor 
“voluntarily.” Sociology has generated a huge literature on 
the relationship between work organizations and trade 
unions that cannot be summarized in a chapter on labor- 
markets and trade unions.
11. For an impressively radical incorporation of this fact 
into economic theory see Solow 1991.
12. To the extent that employers are interested in effi­
cient labor markets and legitimate workplace authority, they 
may also be interested in fairness. This is the ultimate reason 
for the possibility of collective bargaining and of political 
and industrial inclusion of organized labor in a capitalist po­
litical economy.
13. To sociologists, unions promoting institutionalized 
labor market segmentation exhibit a double face, as agents 
of both equality and inequality; of social inclusion as well as 
social exclusion, or closure; and of universalism as well as 
particularism. In the political literature on trade unions, this 
is captured in distinctions like that between political union­
ism and business unionism.
14. In his book A  Theory o f  Employment Systems, Marsdcn 
(1999) offers a sophisticated efficiency-theoretical analysis 
o f work organization, i.e., o f the division of labor and the 
structure of authority and joint regulation at the point of 
production. Work organization is treated as the result o f an 
interaction between different types of work skills and labor 
markets, the need for both workers and employers to pro­
tect themselves against one another’s opportunism, and the 
requirement of simple transaction rules that allow for effi­
cient monitoring. Marsden can show that dependent on the 
national institutional context, this gives rise to different so­
lutions that remain stable over time and are more or less uni­
formly adopted in their countries.
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When the Taylorist organization o f industrial work had 
rcachcd its zenith in the 1970s, unions in a number of coun­
tries raised demands for new forms of work organization in­
volving job enlargement, team working, worker involve­
ment, direct participation, etc. To some extent this recalled 
past struggles over craft or bureaucratic control of the labor 
process. Especially in Scandinavian countries, demands for 
an improvement in the “quality of working life” were taken 
up by governments—which hoped for a shift of union poli­
cies toward nonmonetary “qualitative” objectives—and em­
ployers dissatisfied with declining productivity and product 
quality. In America, programs to improve the quality of 
working life were first put forward by management and were 
regarded with suspicion by unions, who were afraid of los­
ing control over the wage-effort bargain. The movement 
dwindled away when rapid deindustrialization removed its 
cause and the return of unemployment again changed the 
priorities of workers, unions, and governments.
15. Ambivalent attitudes of trade unions toward the law 
as a repressive as well as supportive force may be recon­
structed in terms of an economic sociology of law and legal 
practice, along t he lines o f the contribution of Edelman and 
Stryker to this volume.
16. For a cogent sociological formulation of the politics 
of union wage restraint see Pizzorno 1978, which empha­
sizes the conversion of (unrealistic) demands for redistribu­
tion into (realistic) demands for political compensations of 
wage moderation. On the comparative empirics of corpo- 
ratist wage moderation and political exchange see Cameron 
1984 and Castles 1987, for many others.
17. While in transition countries they seem to find it hard 
to get established in the first place (Bryant and Mokrzycki 
1995).
18. The enormous literature on union density cannot be 
reviewed here. The research referred to above agrees that 
with time, institutional conditions have overall become 
more important determinants of unionization than the in­
formal networks of social relations in occupational commu­
nities that seem to have dominated in the early history of 
trade unions. In other words, the determinants of union 
membership seem to have shifted from a union’s “logic of 
membership” to its “logic of influence,” i.e., the character 
of its relations with the state and employers. Institutional 
analyses have therefore superseded early econometric analy­
ses that conceived of union membership as the result of in­
dividual decisions.
19. Paraphrasing the title o f Steven Vogel’s book on 
deregulation, Freer Markets, More Rules (1996).
20. This trajectory, of course, differs from that envisaged 
by the growing literature in the United States and Britain on 
a “revitalization” o f trade unions as progressive-democratic 
popular movements (for impressive examples see Levi 2002; 
Voss and Sherman 2000). Unions have always attracted high 
expectations of intellectuals, and sometimes they have lived 
up to them. Intellectuals are also known for their belief in 
faith-healing. Today, however, it is far from clear if unions 
will still be able to fulfill their bread-and-butter functions in 
the labor market, and how. It is even less clear if the regula­
tion of labor markets and employment can still be related to 
progressive politics in the centers of advanced postindustrial 
capitalism. Maybe the unions of the industrial age, with their 
combined economic and political roles, will dissolve in two 
separate and unrelated institutional equivalents, labor law 
and single-issue campaigns for social justice. I f  this were to 
happen, sociologists would at least have the concepts to ac­
count for it.
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